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I. INTRODUCTION
The nouvelle vague among prominent U.S. public policy spokesmen
is the facilitation of corporate mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of
corporate bigness, and the emasculation of the anti-merger law. They
claim that this kind of bold new departure is needed to enable firms in
the United States to challenge large foreign rivals and regain global
competitiveness.
"We are simply living in a different world today," proclaimed the
late Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge. "Because of larger mar-
kets, the cost of research and development, new product innovation,
marketing, and so forth... it takes larger companies to compete success-
fully."' While U.S. firms have been restrained from consolidating, he
argued, their foreign competitors have outmerged, outrun, and out-domi-
nated them: "For example, in 1960 twenty-seven of the thirty largest in-
dustrial companies in the world were United States firms--over ninety
percent. In 1984, only ten of those top thirty world-wide industrial com-
panies were United States companies-just one-third. That is a drop of
nearly sixty percent."2 The United States, he concluded, must throw it-
self into the race for corporate bigness. It must "not be stopped by those
who are preoccupied with outdated notions about firm size" 3-this on
1 Baldridge, The Administration's Legislative Proposal and Its Ramifications, 55 ANTITRUsT
L.J. 29, 34 (1986).
2 Id. at 31.
3 Merger Law Reform: Hearings on S. 2022 and S. 2160 Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 22 (1986)(statement of Hon. Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary, Dept.
of Commerce). In the United States, claims about the alleged link between firm size and interna-
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the authoritative precept (enunciated by James C. Miller III, the erst-
while chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) of fashioning public
policy "within the context of the latest and most persuasive theory and
evidence." 4
Reportedly, some top United States business executives agree.
They, too, boldly afr the "new learning" that corporate "combina-
tions strengthen U.S. companies and help them withstand pressure from
foreign competitors."5 If "our industries are going to survive," they
warn, "there have to be additional consolidations to achieve needed econ-
omies of scale." 6 Corporate consolidation and bigness, they also con-
clude, are "perhaps the only answer to saving a maximum number of
jobs for this country."7
These pronunciamentos, and the Weltanschauung which they re-
flect, are hardly novel. In form and substance, they are an uncanny (and
not very imaginative) reincarnation of the mindset that governed eco-
nomic policy making in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, as now,
bigness was believed to be an essential prerequisite for global competi-
tiveness. Then, as now, policymakers believed their domestic industries
tional competitiveness are not new. For example, some ten years after the formation of the U.S.
Steel Corporation, George W. Perkins, a prominent promoter and director of the corporation, told
the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: "We have been infinitely more success-
ful in expanding our foreign trade than would have been possible under competitive conditions." L.
BRANDEIS, BUSINESS, A PROFEssIoN 226 (1933). If U.S. Steel were broken up, would the successor
companies be as efficient as the steel giant? According to Perkins, "Not as efficient. If I were asked
to put my finger on one disadvantage [of the hypothetical successor companies] greater than the
other, it would be its effect on foreign trade. You take ten such companies and go out and compete
with Germany. It is self-evident that we could not begin to do it as effectively as with one large
company." Id. at 232-33.
However, as Louis Brandeis observed at the time, "The facts show that the organization of the
Steel Trust [in 1901] arrested the development of the American export trade in steel." Id. at 226.
Citing the analysis of T. Good, Brandeis wrote:
From the moment that the Steel Trust got to work the American iron and steel industry was
diverted from natural to unnatural developments. Costs and prices of raw material were in-
flated; progress toward economy was arrested; retrogression set in and American's rosy chances
of annexing the world's export trade were shattered.... It is, indeed, a demonstrable fact that
the trust has done more harm than good from an American point of view, that it has burdened
and handicapped the American steel trade, and incidentally given Britain, Germany and other
countries better chances in the race. Last year, 1910, the British iron and steel exports were
further in advance of those of America than they were in 1900, the year before the Steel trust
got down to business; while German exports, which were about thirty per cent below those of
the United States in 1900, are now something like three hundred percent above them.
Id. at 227.
4 Antitrust Policy and Competition: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 5 (1984)(statement of Hon. James C. Miller, III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).
5 Executives Support Large Mergers To Counter Foreign Competition, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1984,
at 33, col. 4 [hereinafter Executives Support Large Mergers).
6 Greenhouse, Making Mergers Even Easier, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
7 Executives Support Large Mergers, supra note 5.
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to be helpless before the onslaught of giant foreign companies. Then, as
now, consolidation and megamergers were believed to be a critical tool
for combating le defi americain.
The original European bigness manifesto was issued by J.J. Servan-
Schreiber. The largest corporations, he wrote, "are the ones most likely
to undertake the investment and research activities essential to successful
competition.. . ." Large size, he proclaimed, "permits the development
of an advanced scientific potential" and "pushes the firm into new areas
and thereby places it in a position of leadership." If Europe deprived
itself of the "dynamism, organization, innovation, and boldness that
characterize the giant American corporations," he warned, it would "fall
even further behind" in the global competitive race. The challenge for
European governments, he concluded, was clear: "Creation of large in-
dustrial units which are able both in size and management to compete
with the American giants," and "choosing fifty to one hundred firms
which, once they are large enough, would be the most likely to become
world leaders of modern technology in their fields." Like some U.S.
policymakers today, he too derided extant European policies which
posed obstacles to the corporate mergers and consolidations necessary
for attaining world bigness. He, too, argued that there was no place for
an anti-merger policy in what he conceived to be the "new age. '
In academic circles, this position was most forcefully articulated by
Professor Andr6 Marchal, the doyen of political economy in France and
a widely respected adviser to European policymakers. The objective of
public policy, he said, was threefold: to adapt firm size in the Common
Market to the requirements of an extended European and world market;
to protect Europe from foreign (primarily United States) domination;
and to assure the future economic cohesion of a united Europe. Accord-
ing to Marchal, encouragement of mergers and concentration-the re-
structuring of Europe into a market of oligopolies-was the only means
to that end.9
8 J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE 24, 53, 67, 153, 159, 160 (1968). See
also D. SWANN, COMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1983).
9 The report by Professor Marchal was presented to a Colloquium on Cooperation, Concentra-
tion and Mergers in the European Economic Community ("EEC"), held at the University of Paris,
Oct. 26-28, 1967, and was reprinted as Marchal, Rapport, REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 25, 30-31
(Jan.-Feb. 1968)(Authors' translation from the French). To be sure, there were dissenters from this
view. For example, Hans von der Groeben, member of the EEC Commission in charge of Competi-
tion Policy, wrote that it is imperative "to put principal reliance on competition as the guiding force
of economic affairs in the Community." The European Treaty, he continued, "has assigned to com-
petition the fundamental role of directing, coordinating, and stimulating economic activity in the
Common Market," and has prescribed (in Article III) "a mechanism to assure that competition will
be protected from subversion." Id. at 26 (loosely translated from the German).
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Substantially increasing firm size, Marchal said, was an indispensa-
ble prerequisite for enhancing productivity. In contrast to the typical
firm under "atomistic" competition, he argued, the giant firm enjoys
economies of scale: it can reduce costs by using the most advanced tech-
niques of production; it can maximize the benefits of the division of la-
bor; it can distribute fixed costs over a mass production volume of
output; it can combine the factors of production in the most efficient
manner; it can protect itself against fluctuations in production and price.
In the factor market, the giant firm can purchase in large quantities at
favorable prices, obtain preferences in transportation rates, and attract
the most skilled workers and the best managers. In the product market,
it is in a superior position to conduct market research and to increase
sales by massive advertising expenditures. 10 Above all, however, the gi-
ant firm has the wherewithal to finance research and development and
thus serve as the harbinger of technological progress. Accepting the
Schumpeterian hypothesis, 1 Marchal believed that the giant firm is the
prime motive force in long-run economic growth and development.12
Marchal concluded that, unless Europe chose to be permanently
condemned to a David-against-Goliath struggle, there was really only
one viable alternative: to emulate the size of the United States' corporate
giants and to match their prowess in productivity, organization, and fi-
nance. To underscore his point, Marchal cited the following size com-
parisons among European and United States firms. In 1963, the largest
German corporation would have ranked only twenty-seventh among
U.S. giants, the largest Italian corporation only thirty-third, the largest
French firm only fiftieth. A successful firm like Volkswagen would have
ranked no higher than twenty-sixth, and Siemens would have been much
further down the list. Unless this trend was reversed-and this could
have been accomplished only through massive mergers and concentra-
10 Marchal, supra note 9, at 31 (Authors' translation from the French).
11 J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-106"(1942).
12 Marchal, supra note 9, at 34. At the time, Pieter Verloren van Themaat, professor at the
University of Utrecht and Director-General of Competition Policy of the EEC Commission, strongly
dissented from this analysis. Noting the serious lacunae in scientific knowledge about concentration,
and warning that contemporary theories run the danger of being contradicted by tomorrow's reality,
van Themaat focused particular criticism on the theories of Schumpeter and Galbraith which corre-
late concentration with invention, innovation, and efficiency. He cited evidence from hearings before
the U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee in 1964 and 1965 to support his contention
that individuals and small and medium-sized businesses still play a significant role in invention and
innovation (e.g. rockets, television, jet engines, dacron, DDT, bakelite, and cellophane). "The
American findings," he concluded, "should serve as a warning that the generally accepted hypothe-
ses about the advantages of giant firm size do not necessarily conform to reality." Diskussionsbei-
trag, REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 92, 94 (Jan.-Feb. 1968)(loosely translated from the German).
Van Themaat's observations were a distinct minority view at the Paris colloquium, however.
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tion-Marchal feared that Europe would inevitably fall victim to coloni-
zation by United States world-class super-firms. 3
In its famous Memorandum of April 1966, the EEC Commission
embraced this position:
The large European market which is being created and the growth of
trade and competition with the rest of the world make it necessary... for
many European firms to expand either through internal development or
through amalgamation with other enterprises. In many cases, the economic
structures in Europe do not yet match the latest trends in the world.
Concentrations which increase productivity are all the more desirable
if they are effected across national boundaries and are thus oriented toward
an integration of the markets. It is therefore necessary to take a generally
positive attitude toward such concentrations. 
1 4
In the Commission's view, the restructuring of European industry was a
dire necessity, not only because of "steadily increasing international com-
petition on world markets" but because of the growing competition from
disparately large foreign enterprises-"particularly American and Japa-
nese"-which had established themselves in the Common Market. 5
On June 29, 1966, underscoring the policy thrust of the Memoran-
dum, the president of the EEC Commission informed the European Par-
liament that "competition within the Common Market and competition
from outside the market, as well as the need to promote technological
progress, make an increase in firm size not only desirable, but indispensa-
ble for survival." Therefore, he said, "the Commission will actively en-
courage the principal means of achieving that goal by supporting the
necessary mergers, concentration, intercorporate stock ownership, joint
ventures, etc."
16
13 Marchal, supra note 9, at 38-39. Marchal cited the trend of United States direct investment in
Europe as an index of progressive colonization: $637 million in 1950; $1,680 million in 1957; $3,104
million in 1961; $3,722 million in 1962; and $4,471 million in 1963. He deemed it significant that,
between 1950 and 1963, United States direct investment in Europe increased by 602%, while the
corresponding rate in Latin America was only 95% and in Canada only 263%. Id. at 40.
14 Concentration of Enterprises in the Common Market, 26 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9
(Memorandum of the Commission of the European Economic Community to the Governments of
the Member States)[hereinafter EEC Memorandum]. Lest the Memorandum be subject to differing
interpretations, Willy Christian Schlieder, Chief-of-Staff of the Commission, sought to remove any
remaining uncertainty. To reassure the European business community, he declared flatly that, as a
matter of law, Article 85 of the Treaty was not applicable to mergers; that Article 86 could be
applied only to mergers of monopolistic dimensions, and only if accompanied by an abuse of power;
and that, as a matter of policy, the Commission shall encourage all "economically justifiable merg-
ers." Rapport, REVUE DUt MARCHE COMMUN 215, 220, 225 (Jan.-Feb. 1968).
15 EEC Memorandum, supra note 14, at 8.
16 Marchal, supra note 9, at 28. This mindset-what can best be called the bigness complex-
electrified European policymakers:
In the early sixties the sentiment spread within the [European Community] that the concentra-
tion process could not be stopped and should not be stopped.... Tihe penetration of foreign
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In that era, Professor Henk de Jong reported, Europeans had come
to believe that it was "the task of industrialists to concentrate; it was the
task of authorities to facilitate the movement." 17 Anti-merger statutes
were weakened and unenforced, as most European governments pro-
claimed consolidation to be the business executive's patriotic duty."8
The result was a sustained period of unprecedented corporate con-
solidation across Europe, beginning in the 1950s, and reaching historic
peaks in the 1960s. "A fascination with giantism, a mania for mergers,
call it what you will," Fortune reported in 1970, "but Europe's leading
businessmen are infected with it. They are merging companies with such
haste and sweep that no label seems quite adequate."" The impact on
economic structure was apparent, and sizable. As Table 1 shows, aggre-
Table 1
Shares of the Largest EEC Firms in the Gross Domestic Product of
Extractive and Manufacturing Industries.
Size class 1960 1965 1970
1- 4 5.8% 6.8% 8.1%
1- 8 10.4% 11.8% 14.6%
1-20 20.9% 22.6% 29.0%
1-50 35.1% 35.1% 45.7%
Source: Jacquemin and de Lichtbuer, Size Structure, Stability and Performance of the Largest
British and EEC Firms 4 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 393, at 394 (1973).
companies (mainly American) which were said to threaten Europe with "economic colonial-
ism" led to cries for "truly European companies" and started the propaganda campaign for
mere size. The European Association of National business groups ("UNICE") produced a doc-
ument which compared the sizes of European companies with those of American and unfail-
ingly found that General Motors' profits [were] larger than the total sales of Volkswagen [and
that] the Belgian budget could be financed from the profits of the four largest American compa-
nies.... The main branches of industry were compared with American branches and all Euro-
pean companies were found to be below the required measure. The document pointed
regretfully to the thousands of mergers taking place [abroad] during the late fifties and early
sixties, against which the EEC mergers lagged far behind. The invasion of American firms into
the European market was regarded as a distinct threat and various advantages of giant firms
were stressed (research and development, automation, management, sales strategy).
Economic Concentration: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, part 7, Concentration Outside the United States, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
3627-28 (1968)(statement of Professor Henk de Jong, Univ. of Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands)[hereinafter Economic Concentration Hearings].
17 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 16, at 3628.
18 Geroski and Jacquemin, Large Firms in the European Corporate Economy and Industrial Pol-
icy in the 1980s, in EUROPEAN INDUSTRY: PUBLIC POLICY AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 343, 345
(A. Jacquemin ed. 1984); Linge, Europe Touts Mergers as Means to Face Increasing Competition in
World Markets, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1968, at 34, col. I.
19 Siekman, Europe's Love Affair with Bigness, FORTUNE, Mar. 1970, at 95.
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gate concentration across Europe escalated substantially during the
1960s.
But did merger-induced corporate giantism provide salvation for
European industry? Did it promote world-class competitiveness? Was it
a success and a model of industrial policy worthy of emulation? Or, as a
persuasive body of empirical evidence suggests, has bigness proved to be
a liability, rather than an asset, for European industry?
In this context, we shall explore these questions and trace the Euro-
pean experience with merger-induced giantism. Proceeding on a coun-
try-by-country basis, the rationale undergirding the corporate
consolidation policies and their impact on economic performance will be
reviewed. For comparative purposes,the Japanese experience (which
runs counter to current popular mythology) will be contrasted with that
in Europe. Finally, in our conclusion we shall discuss some implications
of our analysis, one of which is that merger-induced giantism is not the
key to increased competitiveness.
II. UNITED KINGDOM
Beginning in 1964, corporate bigness and consolidation in British
industry were consciously promoted as a matter of government policy.
The underlying rationale was perhaps best articulated in 1966, in legisla-
tion creating the Industrial Reorganization Corporation ("IRC"), a gov-
ernment body charged with encouraging mergers. The IRC's enabling
legislation cited the "need for more concentration and rationalization to
promote the greater efficiency and international competitiveness of Brit-
ish industry." It contended that many "production units in this country
are small by comparison with the most successful companies in interna-
tional trade, whose operations are often based on a much larger market."
It expressed the belief that "the typical company in Britain is too small to
achieve long production runs; to take advantage of economies of scale; to
undertake effective research and development; to support specialist de-
partments for design and marketing; to install the most modern equip-
ment or to attract the best qualified management." What was needed,
the IRC reasoned, was an industrial structure "which will enable us to
make the most effective use, in the years ahead, of our resources of skill,
management and capital." Mergers, consolidation, and corporate big-
ness, it concluded, would "secure a lasting improvement in the structure
and competitive strength of British industry."20 Two years later, in
1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson called for a restructuring of British
20 DEPr. OF ECON. AFFAIRS, CMND 2889, 1, 4 (HMSO 1966).
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industries "on a scale and at a speed such as we have not seen in this
century," including a rethinking of Britain's traditional hostility to mo-
nopolies and mergers.21
Thus aided and abetted by government, British industry proceeded
to exercise its penchant for merging. But the results for economic per-
formance, the evidence shows, have been dismal and, in some key indus-
tries, catastrophic.
A. Automobiles
In the automobile industry, Britain's "natioinal champion" was to be
British Leyland. As Chart 1 shows below, a succession of mergers, ac-
quisitions and consolidations had, by the mid-1960s, concentrated British
automobile production in the hands of two firms, British Motor Holdings
(including Austin, Morris, and Jaguar) and Leyland Motors (including
Rover and Triumph). In 1968, when these two companies fell victim to
financial difficulties, the government promoted a merger between them to
create British Leyland. The consolidation-creating a monopoly of pro-
duction in the United Kingdom market, and the fifth largest automotive
manufacturer in the world at the time22 -was justified as essential if Brit-
ain were to remain in the world league of automobile production.23
Contrary to these hopes, however, the performance of the British
Leyland combine persistently deteriorated thereafter. By the early-
1970s, British Leyland exhibited declining sales, escalating unit costs, a
productivity drop that placed it at the bottom of European volume car
producers, and lost export sales. By 1975, financial losses amounted to
£300 million.24 Internal company documents, prepared in 1973, identi-
fied a number of disabilities of British Leyland's giant size, including loss
of managerial authority and control, lack of information and miscom-
munication of corporate policy, and the uncertainties and adverse morale
effects of successive mergers and consolidations.25 More generally, "cen-
tral management grappled with the overwhelming problem of having too
many plants, with too many workers producing product ranges with too
many models. '" 26 Seven years following its formation, an outside director
of the firm summarized British Leyland's situation in 1975 as "a bloody
21 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 16, at 3683.
22 p. DUNN=r, THE DECLINE OF THE BRITISH MOTOR INDUSTRY 101 (1980).
23 Hart, British Industrial Policy, in THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 147 (C. Barfield &
W. Schambra eds. 1986).
24 P. DUNNETr, supra note 22. at 130, 133; IL PRYKE, THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES: POLI-
CIES AND PERFORMANCE SINCE 1968 at 222-23 (1981).
25 R. WHIPP & P. CLARK, INNOVATION AND THE AUTO INDUSTRY 96 (1986).
26 Id. at 97.
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When banks refused to continue to lend to British Leyland in 1975,
the firm confronted a cash crisis. The government bailed out British
Leyland, rescued it from bankruptcy, and effectively nationalized it.
However, government control continued to be premised on the bigness
mystique. As described by industry analyst D.T. Jones, government
further compounded the problems of British Leyland management by cen-
tralizing decision making and creating one large car division employing
over 100,000 people.... The [government] solution was, in effect, a contin-
uation of the thinking used to justify the original merger in 1968, i.e., em-
phasizing the potential economies of scale in an integrated production
operation rather than tackling the problems of achieving that scale through
improved productivity.2 8
Clearly, British Leyland's performance over the decade following
1975 has been less than auspicious: production has plunged from more
than 900,000 cars in 1972, to 410,000 in 1986; its share of the United
Kingdom new-car market has dropped from 40% in 1968 to less than
18% (see Table 2); and since 1979, the firm has accumulated losses total-
ing $2.29 billion.2 9 In fact, for the British auto industry, bigness has
translated into more, not less, dependence on government for financial
sustenance. According to one account, government support for British
Leyland totaled $5.4 billion over the years since 1975-support which
owing to the firm's size and employment has transcended philosophical
differences between Labourites and Conservatives.30
In sum, as The Economist points out, "merger after merger... was
supposed to create a creature strong enough to stop the rot, to realize
economies of scale and face up to foreign competition. Then another one
was needed." But the strategy failed. The history of British Leyland
is a parable of how such lumping together of good with bad is no match for
winnowing out the bad and running the good competitively. Its successive
mergers and reorganisations produced a ragbag range of cars that never
27 Carley, British Leyland Offers Textbook Case of Ills Afflicting U.K. Firms, Wall St. J., Apr. 11,
1975, at 1, col. 6. Particularly hard-hit was the Rover division: "Had Rover remained independent,
its fate might have been happier. In 1967, it was profitable, had a successful range of models, and
had plans for products that, with hindsight, would probably have sold well." Rover Chained, THE
ECONOMIST, July 19, 1986, at 74. For a detailed examination of Rover's unfortunate fate in the
British Leyland bureaucracy, See, R. WHIPP & P. CLARK, supra note 25. Others have pointed out
that the initial British Leyland consolidation was itself necessitated by the failures of the firms that
had been merged and acquired prior to their consolidation into British Leyland. See Economic Con-
centration Hearings, supra note 16, at 3695.
28 D. JONES, MATURITY AND CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CAR INDUSTRY: STRUCTURAL
CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 47-48 (1981).
29 Hemp, Rover Pins Hope on US. Love of Luxury, Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
30 Id.; Lucas, British Aerospace Buys Rover for $280 Million, AUTOMoTIvE NEws, Apr. 4, 1988,
at 64.
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Table 2
British Leyland and Import Shares in the UK Auto Market
















Sources: PRYKE, THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES: POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE SINCE 1968,
220 (1981); WILKS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE MOTOR INDUSTRY, 70, 206 (1984).
settled down to win market share from the car companies of America, Ja-
pan, France, West Germany and Italy.31
The recent success of Jaguar is an instructive counterpoint to the
British Leyland fiasco. Once it was spun off from British Leyland and
privatized in 1984, Jaguar became a profitable company. z2 This lends
credence to the resolution of British Leyland's problems suggested by
The Economist in 1977: The firm's problems are too large for the man-
agement to handle, the magazine's editors observed. Their solution?
"Split British Leyland back into its component parts."
33
B. Steel
In pursuit of the economies of large scale, the British government
merged (and nationalized) the country's largest steel companies in 1967
to create the British Steel Corporation ("BSC"). At the genesis of BSC,
the combine was massive. It represented a consolidation of fourteen par-
ent companies controlling 145 subsidiaries and 47 foreign affiliates with
plants on more than sixty major sites. In the first year of operation, BSC
31 THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 1988, at 12.
32 See Marcom, Jaguar's Comeback Is Getting a Boost From Latest Model, Wall St. J., Apr. 17,
1987, at 8, col. 4.
33 THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1977, at 88.
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controlled 92% of British steel production, employed 270,000 workers,
and produced more than 23.3 million tons of steel, making BSC the
world's third largest steel concern.34
Yet in steel as in automobiles, bigness proved to be a trap, not a
panacea. A decade after its formation, the corporation confessed (in its
own words) to being "unable to produce sufficient steel, in many in-
stances to meet required delivery times, or make steel of the right qual-
ity.' '35 Its delivery time for buyers grew longer and more unreliable. The
quality of its products deteriorated. And, as British Steel's major cus-
tomers told a select committee, they had-turned to other sources of sup-
ply because BSC was unable to meet their requirements.36
In 1980, Aylen's analysis of innovation found British Steel's record
deplorable. He reported the United Kingdom to have one of the lowest
shares of modem oxygen-furnace steel output of any of the world's major
steel producing nations. British steel was slow to adopt modern continu-
ous casting plant techniques, he found, and in blast furnaces, he reported
that "Britain ha[d] lagged behind in adopting new blast furnace technol-
ogy, both in construction of new large furnaces and in adoption of im-
proved burden preparation design, and working practice at existing
furnaces." In hot wide strip mills, he found "British strip mills ha[d] a
lower rate of adoption of both quality-enhancing innovations . . .and
output-enhancing innovations.... ." Aylen noted that, as a result, most
of Britain's North Sea oil pipeline had to be imported from abroad.37
British Steel's unenviable performance is reflected in its financial re-
sults from its inception in 1967 up to 1983. As Table 3 shows, the Cor-
poration recorded positive profits in only four of sixteen years. Its
cumulative losses over the period amounted to $4 billion.
31
34 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 16, at 3865; Hart, supra note 23, at 141.
35 R. PRYKE, supra note 24, at 196.
36 Id. Diseconomies of excessive size became increasingly apparent. According to one account,
centralization of orders and their allocation to mills meant that many customers were supplied from
works with which they had not dealt previously; and, as a result of an inability to directly contact the
mill. processing their orders, customers perceived a further decline in the quality of service. Cocker-
ill, Steel, in THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 146 (P. Johnson ed. 1980).
37 Aylen, Innovation in the British Steel Industry, in TECHNICAL INNOVATION AND BRIrISH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 209, 212, 216, 219 (K. Pavitt ed. 1980).
38 See also Y. MENY & V. WRIGHT, LA CRISE DE LA SIDERURGIE EUROPtENNE 1974-1984
(1985).
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Table 3
British Steel Corporation Losses and Declines in Market Share,
1967-1983
Profit/Loss Market Share Import Share




1970/1971 (10) 70.4 5.6
1971/1972 (68) 66.0 9.6
1972/1973 3 63.7 12.1
1973/1974 39 62.2 13.2
1974/1975 73 58.0 15.7
1975/1976 (255) 55.7 18.2
1976/1977 (95) 55.0 19.1
1977/1978 (443) 54.8 20.4





Note: Figures in parentheses are losses.
Source: Hart, "British Industrial Policy," in Barfield and Schumbra eds., The Politics of Industrial
Policy, 143 (1986).
Ironically, the independent sector of the British steel industry-
comprising small, nonintegrated "minimills", and considered inconse-
quential and ignored at the creation of British Steel Corporation-has
performed remarkably well. A 1978 study revealed that over the preced-
ing three years, all but six of the sixty independent steel firms were profit-
able (in contrast with the huge losses recorded by British Steel).39 In
fact, as Table 4 shows, the increased shares of imported steel in the Brit-
ish market came completely at the expense of British Steel Corporation.
The smaller mills in the independent sector held their own, and even
increased their share of the United Kingdom market slightly. As one
industry analyst concludes, "New entrants have found increased produc-
tivity easier to achieve in small, new steelworks than has BSC, with its
large complexes and entrenched workforce attitudes."40
39 THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 1978, at 97. See also THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1981, at 76.




Net' Deliveries of Finished Steel to the UK Market by Source of
Supply, 1970 and 1977
Source 1970 1977
(million tonnes) (% of total) (million tonnes) (% of total)
British Steel Corporation 13.4 70.4 8.3 54.6
Independents 4.6 24.1 3.8 25.1
Imports 1.0 5.5 3.1 20.3
Net deliveries to UK market 19.1 100.0 15.2 100.0
'excluding semi-manufactures for further processing.
Source: Cockerill, supra note 36, at 135.
Reviewing two decades of evidence, one student of the industry who
formerly advocated bigness profoundly revised his thinking. "The time
has surely come to recognize that the central planning and management
of steel, of which I was once a great advocate, has failed," writes Richard
Pryke.41 Structural dissolution of British Steel and smaller organiza-
tional size, he concludes, would not only enhance economic performance,
but it "has the attraction that extra business might be obtained at the
expense of imports."'42
C. Computers
Encouraged by government, the British computer industry was con-
solidated through a number of mergers and acquisitions, beginning in the
late-1950s and, as Chart 2 shows below, culminating in 1968 with the
formation of International Computers Ltd. ("ICL"). All told, ICL was
the product of mergers involving nine British-owned producers of com-
puters and computer-related equipment. At its genesis, ICL accounted
for 41.4% of the United Kingdom computer market.43
However, ICL's performance has failed to meet expectations. Over
the period 1969 to 1974, its share of the British market fell by nearly
eighteen percentage points, from 49.4% to 31.7%-this despite a govern-
ment procurement policy favoring purchases from ICL for state com-
puter needs.' By 1978, one English analyst caustically commented that
"the creation of a single computer company, International Computers,
has resulted in persistent claims on government funds rather than a com-
41 R. PRYKE, supra note 24, at 209.
42 Id.
43 Stoneman, Computers, in THE STRUCTURE oF BRrTISH INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 160, 166.
44 Id. Denton, Financial Assistance to British Industry in PUBLIC ASSISTANCE TO INDUsTRY:
PROTECTION AND SUBSIDIES IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY 143 (W. Corden & G. Fels eds. 1976).
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pany capable of holding its own in world markets."4 In 1979, The Econ-
omist observed that, despite the fact that 25% to 30% of ICL's sales were
"captive sales" to British government agencies, the firm's share of the
British market had continued to fall. By contrast, the share of small
computer companies offering mini and micro computers-growing fields
largely ignored by ICL-had increased dramatically."
By 1981, the disabilities of bigness were apparent: the firm had be-
come mired in a cumbersome management system. Ostensibly the na-
tion's premier information processor, ICL inventory and sales data
systems operated with lags three times longer than those of its smaller
rivals. The firm's costs soared, and its position deteriorated faster than
its own management information systems could detect. In addition, at a
time when the fastest growing area of the market comprised small and
medium-sized computer models, ICL concentrated the bulk of its invest-
ment on big computers.47
D. Textiles
Beginning in the 1960s, in an attempt to arrest the declining compet-
itiveness of the British textiles industry, the government permitted Cour-
taulds, already the United Kingdom's largest producer of cellulose fibers,
to acquire an even larger share of the domestic market.48 Through hori-
zontal and vertical integration the firm was to become competitive with
imported textile products. As a result, the United Kingdom textile in-
dustry became far more concentrated than its counterparts in other in-
dustrialized countries."
Here again, however, merger-induced giantism and high industry
concentration failed to bolster industry performance. The United King-
dom's trade balance in textiles declined rapidly throughout the 1970s,
and government subsidies and protection from foreign imports expanded
apace.50 Indeed, the evidence suggests that bigness and-concentration
retarded experimentation and innovation-and success-with product-
45 Mottershead, Industrial Policy, in BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY 1960-74 at 480 (F. Blackaby
ed. 1978).
46 THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 1979, at 81-82.
47 THE ECONOMIST, July 4, 1981, at 78.
48 See Shepherd, Textiles: New Ways of Surviving in an Old Industry, in EUROPE'S INDUSTRIES
26, 43-48 (G. Shepherd, F. Duchene, & C. Saunders eds. 1983). For a detailed examination of the
failure of an earlier merger between Courtaulds and its leading rival, see K. COWLING, P.
STONEMAN, J. CUBBIN, J. CABLE, G. HALL, S.DOMBERGER & P. DUTTON, MERGERS AND ECo-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 81-92 (1980)[hereinafter K. COWLING].
49 Shepherd, Industrial Change in European Countries: The Experience of Six Sectors, in EURO-
PEAN INDUSTRY: PUBLIC POLICY AND CORPORATE STRATEGY, supra note 18, at 191, 197.
50 Id.
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niche specialization prevalent in the less concentrated, more structurally
competitive textile industries of West Germany and, especially, Italy (see
below).5 In fact, in a significant reorientation of strategy, large British
textile producers recently "have drastically slimmed down their United
Kingdom textile operations and pursued a policy of greater decentralisa-
tion, partly aimed at greater market awareness."
52
E. Machine Tools
The British government also strove to consolidate the machine tool
industry in the hands of a few giant concerns. The industry experienced
a wave of mergers and acquisitions that raised concentration substan-
tially: whereas the twenty largest firms together accounted for 50% of
the field in 1960, a decade later the largest seven producers collectively
accounted for the same share.5 3 In particular, the government sought to
create in Alfred Hebert (already the country's largest producer) the big-
gest machine tool company in all of Europe-this in the belief that supe-
rior size would promote superior performance. 4
The anticipated results never materialized. According to a National
Academy of Engineering report, "Throughout the decade of the 1970s
the productivity level (output per man-hour) in the British machine tool
industry dropped in relation to every major machine tool producing na-
tion except the United States and now lags behind Japan, France, West
Germany, Italy, and Canada."5 5 British tool makers failed to retain their
early technical lead in computer numerical controls as well as in flexible
manufacturing systems.5 6 The industry lost market share at home and
abroad, with imported machine tools rising in market share in the United
Kingdom from 28% in 1970 to 57% by 1980.57 In the latter year, the
industry exhibited the worst trade deficit among major tool producing
nations. 8 Despite substantial, recurrent government financial support of
51 Shepherd, supra note 48, at 47-48; de la Torre, Public Intervention Strategies in the European
Clothing Industries, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 124, 145 (1981).
52 Shepherd, supra note 48, at 45.
53 K. COWLING, supra note 48, at 112.
54 Jones, Machine Tools: Technical Change and Japanese Challenge, in EUROPE'S INDUSTRIES,
supra note 48, 186, 202 [hereinafter Machine Tools]; Daly, Government Supportfor Innovation in the
British Machine Tool Industry: A Case Study, in INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INNOVATION 52, 56-59
(C. Carter ed. 1981).
55 MACHINE TOOL PANEL, U.S. NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'R, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF
THE U.S. MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY 37 (1983) [hereinafter MACHINE TOOL PANEL].
56 Harrop, Crisis in the Machine Tool Industry: A Policy Dilemmafor the European Community,
24 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 61, 69 (1985).
57 Daly, supra note 54, at 61; MACHINE TOOL PANEL, supra note 55, at 37.
58 MACHINE TOOL PANEL, supra note 55, at 37.
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Alfred Herbert, the concern's employment dropped from 15,000 in the
1960s to 5,400 by 1978.19 In 1981, this putative "national champion"
collapsed into receivership.' "It would seem apparent that size is not a
cure for the industry's ills," a recent study of machine tool mergers
concludes.61
F. The General Pattern
The evidence adduced in these case studies is more than anecdotal
and episodic. In their exhaustive statistical analysis of mergers and eco-
nomic performance in the United Kingdom, Cowling et al. find that
Taking a broad sweep of the results the picture is one in which it is difficult
to sustain the view that merger is in fact a necessary or sufficient condition
for efficiency gain. In many cases efficiency has not improved, in some
cases it has declined, in other cases it has improved but no faster than one
would have expected in the absence of merger... More generally we have
various pieces of evidence from our investigations that merger has led to no
apparent improvement in international competitiveness or export
performance.
The problem with British productivity, another study finds, "seems to be
that organizational diseconomies of scale ... have become so great that
they now often outweigh potential technical gains that should arise from
producing on a larger scale."63 Yet another study of British mergers and
consolidations reports strong evidence "that the efficiency of the typical
amalgamation did not improve after merger;" and that, instead, "effi-
ciency would seem to have suffered after merger." 6 Indeed, the accumu-
lating body of empirical evidence detailing the infirmities of merger-
induced corporate giantism may have begun to influence economic policy
thinking, if not action, at the highest levels. Speaking in 1980 in favor of
government policy to encourage companies to "de-merge", Chancellor
Sir Geoffrey Howe expressed the view "that there are cases where busi-
nesses are grouped together inefficiently under a single company um-
brella [which] could in practice be run more dynamically and
effectively."
65
59 Daly, supra note 54, at 58.
60 Jones, Machine Tools, supra note 54, at 202.
61 K. COWLING, supra note 48, at 121.
62 Id. at 370-71.
63 Caves, Productivity Differences Among Industries, in BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
35, 196 (R. Caves & L. Krause eds. 1980).
64 G. MEEKS, DISAPPOINTING MARRIAGE: A STUDY OF THE GAINS FROM MERGER 33, 66
(1977). See also P. HOLL & J. PICKERING, THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF ACTUAL, ABAN-
DONED AND CONTESTED MERGERS (City Univ., London, Working Paper 1986).
65 THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 1980, at 77.
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III. FRANCE
In the post-World War II era, French national policy centered on an
abiding faith in the virtues of corporate bigness. "The large firm appears
today as the most efficient unit of production," French statesman Ray-
mond Barre asserted in 1958; "its role as a motor in growth should be
underlined... it favors improvement of techniques and the quality of
products, and excites competition by innovation.... "66 Two years later,
the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques ("IN-
SEE") proclaimed: "concentration and gerieral improvement of the stan-
dard of living-it is in this framework that our industrial rise is
inscribed... ."67
This faith in bigness was formally codified in the Fifth Plan, adopted
in 1966 as a statement of French national economic policy:
The Fifth Plan therefore proposes to constitute or, where they already exist,
to strengthen a small number of international scale firms or groups capable
of standing up to the foreign groups in the main spheres of competition,
such as technical autonomy, dimensions of production and marketing units,
versatility and balance... reserve strength to hit back quickly on the ap-
pearance of a new product, etc. In most major sectors of industry .... the
number of such groups should be very limited, often restricted to one or
two.
68
Bigness and concentration of industry in the hands of one or two "na-
tional champions" were to be the keys to meeting le deft americain.
These, in turn, would require a deliberate government program encour-
aging consolidation. As articulated at the time by Louis Vallon, a promi-
nent member of the French National Assembly, "French industry cannot
compete with American giants without embarking on a major program
of mergers.
69
Imbued with the bigness mystique, government programs were en-
acted encouraging consolidation and concentration. This included legis-
lation in 1965 and 1967 providing tax exemptions for capital gains
resulting from merger, as well as state loans to subsidize acquisitions.7 °
66 j. SHEAHAN, PROMOTION AND CONTROL OF INDUSTRY IN POSTWAR FRANCE 245 (1963).
67 Id. at 244.
68 J. MCARTHUR & B. SCOTT, INDUSTRIAL PLANNING IN FRANCE 463 (1969)(Second emphasis
added).
69 Vicker, Many European Firms Combine in Bid to Match the Size of U.S. Rivals, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 25, 1965, at 1, col. 6 (quoting Louis Vallon). For further discussion of the picking-the-winner,
"national champion" element in French industrial policy, see Green, Industrial Policy and Policy-
Making, 1974-82, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FRANCE 139, 143 (V. Wright ed. 1984).; Cotta,
Reflexion sur la Politique Industrielle de la France. Le Redeploiment Industriel, in ETUDES DE POLI-
TIQUE INDUSTRIELLE No. 17 (Ministate de l'Industrie, 1977); C. STOFFAES, LA GRANDE MENACE
INDUSTRIELLE (1978).
70 Balassa, The French Economy Under the Fifth Republic, 1958-1978, in THE FIFrH REPUBLIC
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Corporate consolidation was also encouraged by a "marriage bureau"
located in the Ministry of Industry, as well as by the creation of the
Institut de Developpement Industriel.7 1 Amalgamation of "national
champions" typically proceeded within the framework ofplans sectoriels,
government blueprints for mergers in particular industries.72
Thus stimulated, consolidations among French firms escalated
sharply. The average number of corporate mergers more than doubled
between the 1950s and the second half of the 1960s. The value of the
assets of the absorbed companies rose from an annual average of FF85
million during the 1950s to FF1 billion in 1965, and to FF5 billion in
1970. 73 By the mid-1970s, France displayed one of the highest corporate
consolidation rates in Western Europe.74
But what of economic performance?
A. Steel
"The key difference between our industry and the American," a
French steel executive once complained, "is that you have U.S. Steel and
Bethlehem that are big enough and rich enough to make their power felt
anywhere, at any time.... [T]here is no counterpart to these giants in
the Common Market or more broadly in West Europe.
75
Eventually, the grounds for this complaint were removed. Com-
mencing in the late-1950s and continuing for two decades thereafter, a
succession of mergers and acquisitions concentrated the French steel in-
dustry into three dominant groups. The first of these, Usinor, was cre-
ated in 1966 by merging the first and fourth largest French steel
producers. (As Chart 3 shows below, these firms, in turn, had evolved
through prior amalgamations combining five formerly independent pro-
ducers.) At the time of its formation, Usinor ranked as one of the largest
steel makers in Europe, with 50,000 employees, sixteen plants, and five
AT TWENTY 204, 207 (W. Andrews & S. Hoffman eds. 1981); Jenny and Weber, France, 1962-1972,
in THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 133, 142
(D. Mueller ed. 1980) [hereinafter THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS].
71 Michalet, France, in BIG BUSINESS AND THE STATE: CHANGING RELATIONS IN WESTERN
EUROPE 105, 109 (R. Vernon ed. 1974) [hereinafter BIG BUSINESS].
72 Aujac, An Introduction to French Industrial Policy, in FRENCH INDUSTRIAL POLICY 13, 15
(William James Adams & C. Stoffaes eds. 1986).
73 Balassa, supra note 70, at 207.
74 Lauber, The Gaullist Model of Economic Modernization, in THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AT
TWENTY, supra note 70, at 227, 231. In 1965, for example, "some 239 of the 500 largest [French]
firms were involved in one or more mergers... absorbing some 500 companies and purchasing
interests in another 120." J. McARTHUR & B. SCOTT, supra note 68, at 211.
75 J. McARTHUR & B. ScoTr, supra note 68, at 214.
Northwestern Journal of


































The second, DeWendel/Sidelor (now Sacilor), emerged the follow-
ing year as an amalgamation of three major producers which, in turn,
represented the prior combinations of six formerly independent steel
firms. At its genesis, Sacilor ranked as the fourth largest steel firm in the
Common Market and together with Usinor accounted for three-quarters
of total French steel production."
In a third consolidation, in 1970, two of France's largest producers
of fine and specialty steels, Creusot and Loire, merged their operations to
create Creusot-Loire. At the time, Creusot-Lire accounted for 60% of
French specialty steel output.7" In all, the number of French steel produ-
cers is estimated to have fallen by one-half as a result of mergers and
consolidation over the years 1966 to 1975.11
Contrary to expectations, however, this chain of consolidations did
not lead to better economic performance. During the 1970s, productivity
in the industry remained lower than for any of France's major competi-
tors. Contrary to forecasts, production levels fell from 1974 onward.
France's steel giants devoted investment to capacity expansion rather
than to improving productivity; they became ill-fitted mixtures of old and
new plants, with higher operating costs. By 1978, most firms had accu-
mulated sizable losses.80 In that year, confronted with the industry's
warning that "emergency measures were the only alternative to bank-
ruptcy on a massive scale,"81 the government was impelled to bail out the
industry. In effect, the government nationalized the industry by con-
verting a portion of its losses into state equity holdings, and by covering
the remainder with state loans and guarantees. 2 A new holding com-
76 Hayward, Steel, in BIG BUSINESS, supra note 71, at 229, 267; France's No. 1 Steel Maker
Merging with 4th Biggest, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1966, at 6, col. 3.
77 Hayward, supra note 76, at 267; Three Steel Companies in France Plan Merger, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 26, 1967, at 3, col. 3.
78 THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1970, at 64; Messerlin & Saunders, Steek Too Much Investment
Too Late, in EUROPE'S INDUSTRIES, supra note 48, at 52, 68.
79 Messerlin & Saunders, supra note 78, at 68.
80 See Berger, Lame Ducks and National Champions: Industrial Policy in the Fifth Republic, in
THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AT TWENTY, supra note 70, at 292, 298; Levy, Industrial Policy and the Steel
Industry, in FRENCH INDUSTRIAL POLICY, supra note 72, at 63, 66-67; V. PRICE, INDUSTRIAL POLI-
CIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 96 (1981). See also Messerlin & Saunders, supra note 78, at
68.
81 S. COHEN & A. GOUREVITCH, FRANCE IN THE TROUBLED WORLD ECONOMY 70 (1982).
82 V. PRICE, supra note 80, at 96. The indebtedness of the French steel industry had risen from
70.7% of sales in 1965 to 100% in 1975, and to 111% in 1977. On January 1, 1978, the industry had
a debt burden of FF38 billion, while its sales amounted to only FF34 billion. Its debt service con-
sumed 14% of its revenues. Y. MENY & V. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 22. The government's 1978
bailout plan was so generous that Laurent Fabius, the French Budget Minister described it as "le
plus grand scandal fanancier depuis l'affaire de Panama" (the Panama Bubble scandal which had
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pany was created, and the state assumed over FF12 billion of debt and
added a new FF8 billion loan.
83
Like its predecessors, this consolidation also failed to boost perform-
ance. During the 1980s, Usinor and Sacilor have suffered cumulative
combined losses of FF54 billion; in 1986 alone, their consolidated loss
amounted to $2.1 billion.84 The government was forced to declare its
equity in the firms worthless, and to provide additional subsidies.85
Creusot-Loire, which had embarked on an expansionist binge in the
1970s, including the acquisition of Phoenix Steel in the United States,
became a perpetual money-loser to the tune of FF3 billion between 1979
and 1983. In late 1984, while ranking as the second largest private com-
pany in France, the firm declared bankruptcy.
86
B. Computers
The Plan Calcul was launched in 1966 as a grand projet to enhance
the industry's performance and to promote national independence. Con-
centration and consolidation were integral parts of the plan. "In order
that it may be as effective as possible," it was explained at the time,
"State aid will be concentrated on the chosen company-that is to say,
the one that appears in the best position, taking into account the princi-
ples and objectives of the plan. We do not have the means to disperse
our efforts by sprinkling help over a whole group of firms.",
81
A semi-public company, Compagnie Internationale pour
l'Informatique ("CII"), was designated as the "national champion" in
the field, with the objective of competing head-to-head with IBM. 88 A
decade later, in 1975, CII was merged with Honeywell-Bull, and by 1981,
rocked the foundations of the Third Republic). Id. at 34. President Mitterand labelled the FF7
billion in subsidy and FF6 billion in low-interest loans granted to the industry by the (conservative)
Barre government as "13 milliards pour rien" (13 billion for nothing). Id. at 59. For detailed statis-
tics on government subsidies to the French steel industry, see Foll, Les Aides Publiques d l'Industri:
Elements d'Evaluation, ECONOMIE PREVISION No. 70 25-27 (Direction de la Pr6vision, Ministate de
l'Economie, des Finances et du Budget, ISSN 0249-4744 1985).
83 P. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN
AND FRANCE 190 (1986).
84 THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 1986, at 63; Sacilor and Usinor Report Combined Loss for 1986,
Wall St. J., May 5, 1987, at 33, col. 1.
85 Usinor Shareholders In Uproar As France Erases Their Equity, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1986, at 33,
col. 3. The industry was paid FF60 billion in state subsidies between 1978 and 1986. Hall, supra
note 83, at 208.
86 THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1984, at 66, Dec. 15, 1984, at 94.
87 J. MCARTHUR & B. ScoTr, supra note 68, at 367.
88 Delapierre, Gerard-Varet & Zimmermann, The Computer and Data Processing Industry, in
THE STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN INDUSTRY 257, 279 (H. de Jong ed. 1981).
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,the combine ranked as the largest European computer producer.8 9 In
1982, two additional companies engaged in the production of minicom-
puters and peripheral equipment were merged into CII-Bull to form the
Bull groupY0 In addition, CII-Bull was chosen as the preferred supplier
for French government agencies.
CII-Bull's subsequent performance, however, has perenially fallen
short of expectations. The CII/Bull merger "created serious internal
conflicts, which only multiplied the problems of creating efficient and
effective management."91 The combine seems to have been significantly
slower in developing new products than computer producers in other
countries.92 Concentrating all of France's computer "eggs" in the Bull
basket also seems to have obstructed innovations in such areas as
microcomputers. Furthermore, it has prevented the emergence of com-
petitors who might have been more willing to exploit new avenues ne-
glected by Bull.93
By 1981, the French computer industry had still not attained world-
class status.94 Instead, CII-Bull had become one of the largest consum-
ers of French state funds. From 1981 to 1984 it lost almost $500 million,
and it amassed nearly $1 billion in debts. When the firm tottered on the
brink of bankruptcy in 1982, the government was compelled to acquire
most of Bull's equity shares. The firm has survived, not because of big-
ness and superior economic performance, but because of government
subsidies of $600 million since 1982, and state pressure on French com-
panies to spend at least half of their computer budgets on Bull equipment
and apparatus.
9 5
89 Stoffaes, Industrial Policy in the High-Technology Industries, in FRENCH INDUSTRIAL POL-
icy, supra note 72, at 57, 72. Bull had earlier been the leading French computer company. In the
mid-1960s, acquisition of Bull by General Electric led the French government to create its own
national champion in CII. Later, GE had sold Bull to Honeywell. For a devastating critique of
France's effort to create a national champion in the computer field, and the cost of this effort in
public subsidies, see QUATREPOINT & JUBLIN, FRENCH ORDINATEURS DE L'AFFAIRE BULL A
L'ASSASSINAT DU PLAN CALCUL (1977).
90 Stoffaes, supra note 89, at 57.
91 J. ZYSMAN, POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL ORDER: STATE, MARKET, AND IN-
DUSTRY IN FRANCE 152 (1977).
92 Id. at 153.
93 See THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1984, at 94-95. The magazine points out that French re-
searchers developed the first microcomputer, and assembled it in 1973, but failed to recognize its
commercial appeal. IBM reacted similarly. The important difference, the magazine argues, is that
an outsider in the U.S., Apple Computer, was willing to take a chance on microcomputers, and
proved extremely successful in opening up a vast new field.
94 See THE ECONOMIsT, Dec. 5, 1981, at 76.
95 Duck Soup, THE EcONOMi'r, July 16, 1983, at 85; Greenhouse, Challengefor HoneywellBull,
N.Y. Times, May 19, 1987, at Dl, col. 3; Can.A Turnaround WVzard Make Honeywell Bull Work?,
Bus. WK., Apr. 20, 1987, at 84.
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C. Textiles
The French textile industry was also consolidated considerably dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, Dollfus Mieg et Cie. was the product
of a merger between the two largest spinning firms in France, Doilfus
Mieg et Cie. and Ets. Thierrez et Cartier Bresson. Dollfus Mieg et Cie.
and other large textile companies complained bitterly that their travails
during the mid-1960s were (in the words of one of them) due to "the
irrational and abnormal competition . . . of marginal firms which use
outdated, largely amortized machinery in their effort to survive."'9 6 On
the basis of such claims, the government encouraged and financed further
consolidation of the field.9 7 In a policy of "assainissement", the objective
was to eliminate small producers who, it was believed, were obstacles to
modernization and competitiveness.98
The evolution of the Agache-Willot empire epitomizes French tex-
tile consolidation policy in practice.99 Willot was allowed to acquire
more than 100 firms between 1954 and 1964. In 1967, Willot was per-
mitted to merge with Agache, and two years later, the Agache-Willot
combine merged with the Saint Fr~res firm. During the 1970s, the firm
acquired two Parisian retailers, a Belgian retailer, and a furniture chain.
By 1978, Agache-Willot ranked as one of the largest textile groups in
France. In that year, and with government backing, Agache-Willot ac-
quired the Boussac textile group-thereby doubling its sales and becom-
ing the leading European textile producer. In 1979, the firm acquired the
American Korvettes retail operation.
By the 1970s, after a number of other mergers and acquisitions,"°
the French textile industry had come to be dominated by a small number
of very large firms.1"1 Over the next decade, the number of these firms
declined even further-by more than 40.102 In 1981, the manufacturing
arm of the Agache-Willot empire collapsed, with debts of FF2 billion
and monthly losses running at the rate of FF10 to 15 million. Three
months later, the entire holding company failed. This was one of the
96 Mytelka, The French Textile Industry: Crisis and Adjustment, in THE EMERGING INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 129, 143 (H. Jackson & D. Sidjanski eds. 1982).
97 In some cases, government funds were made available for modernization only if such plans
included merger and takeovers. Mytelka, supra note 96, at 145.
98 S. COHEN & P. GOUREVITCH, supra note 81, at 136.
99 Green, Strategic Management and the State: France, in INDUSTRIAL CRISIS: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF THE STATE AND INDUSTRY 161, 181-85 (K. Dyson & S. Wilks eds. 1983).
100 Mytelka, supra note 96, at 142.
101 Shepherd, supra note 49, at 196.
102 S. COHEN & P. GOUREVITCH, supra note 81 at 138.
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largest bankruptcies in French history.
103
Apparently, the consolidation strategy failed. The pace of concen-
tration had outstripped the pace of plant modernization and rationaliza-
tion." 4 This consolidation strategy did not prevent a dramatic import
penetration of the French textile market.1 5 It had not helped French
textile producers to catch up with their more competitive European
counterparts who had chosen to invest in productivity-enhancing plant
and equipment rather than in merger-induced bigness.10 6
D. The General Pattern
The foregoing failures are not unique. According to one expert,
French ventures in giganticism "proved to be a massive drain on the pub-
lie treasury without ever achieving the levels of efficiency that would
have made [the merged firms] powerful competitors even for the French
market."107 According to another, French infatuation with consolida-
tion "was neither a means to increase industrial research and develop-
ment nor a benign transformation in industrial structures."1 8 Scholarly
treatises were beginning to cast doubt on the proposition that had in-
formed French industrial policy (and had not been questioned) for two
decades-i.e., that mergers and corporate bigness would enhance effi-
ciency in production, promote technological progress, and foster interna-
tional competitiveness." °  While success did occur in some areas-such
as aerospace, and military electronics-these were exceptions to the
larger number of failures across a broad front. Typically, "success" oc-
curred in fields where government (rather than the private sector) was
the main customer. 110
Perhaps more important, a succession of collapsing canards boiteux,
necessitating repeated government rescue and bailout, began to erode
103 Green, supra note 99, at 181-82.
104 Mytelka, supra note 96, at 148; Shepherd, supra note 48, at 39.
105 S. COHEN & P. GOUREVITCH, supra note 81, at 137.
106 See id. By the late-1970s, the government itself seemed to concede the failure of its earlier
policy and began to encourage active rivalry between medium-sized firms able to exploit sophisti-
cated new product niches and new export markets. Mytelka, supra note 96, at 159.
107 P. HALL, supra note 83, at 149.
1o8 Mytelka, supra note 96, at 155.
109 See William James Adams, Firm Size and Research Activity France and the United States, 84
Q.J. EcoN. 386 (1970); Jenny & Weber, Profit Rates and Structural Variables in French Manufactur-
ing Industries, 7 EUR. ECON. REv. 187 (1976). Other studies reveal that medium-sized firms out-
performed corporate colossi in export success abroad. Green, supra note 99, at 189, n.4.
110 Stoffaes, supra note 89, at 44-45; DeWitt, French Industrial Policy from 1945-1981: An Assess-
ment, in INDUSTRIAL POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND CoMPE=rvENEss 232 (G. Adams & L. Klein
eds. 1983); Socialism Means Nationalising the Gaullists'Mistakes, THE ECONOMIST, July 16, 1983, at
83-86.
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faith in bigness among pragmatic French politicians and policymak-
ers. 111 In particular, they recognized that the bailout problem was the
result of the government's "national champion" consolidation strategy.
"In the United States there are many companies in the electronics busi-
ness," Francois de Combret recently observed.
When one goes bankrupt, the existence of the industry is not jeopard-
ized.... In France, however, the number of important companies in each
sector is very limited. If Bull had gone bankrupt, the future of the entire
French electronics industry would have been placed in doubt. Hence the
need to rescue companies in trouble.
1 12
There are signs that French industrial theory and policy may be un-
dergoing a metamorphosis. Nearly two decades ago, a group of research-
ers was struck by the disdain of French government officials for small
business. They reported that "the Government officials [they] met viewed
small business and businessmen in stereotypical and unsympathetic
terms. Indeed, the role, competence, motives, and contribution of small
businessmen was often regarded with considerable contempt and suspi-
cion."' 1 3 By 1978, however, the tone of official French thinking had be-
gun to change: "No economy can maintain its dynamism without the
continuous creation of new firms," Giscardian industrial strategy pos-
ited. "This reanimates and stimulates competition. The growth of firms
is often the result of a new idea, of a new product.... Thus the govern-
ment has recently taken significant measures to encourage the creation of
enterprises, and more generally, the development of small and medium-
sized firms."1 1 4
Today, sobered by the experience with giantism in the nationalized
industries, "[S]mall business has begun to look beautiful to France's in-
dustrial planners. After pouring money into the big groups nationalised
in 1981 and 1982, many of which are losing money, the Mitterrand gov-
ernment now hopes that small firms can create new jobs and investment
instead.""' This precept was explicitly incorporated in the latest French
national economic plan."1 6
111 See Berger, supra note 80, at 294.
112 De Combret, What Can the United States Learn from the French Experience?, in FRENCH
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, supra note 72, at 161-62.
113 Suleiman, Industrial Policy Formulation in France, in INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN WESTERN
EUROPE 23, 27-29 (S. Warnecke & E. Suleiman eds. 1975).
114 Mytelka, supra note 96, at 159-60.
115 THE ECONOMIST, May 7, 1983, at 85. See also, Y. MENY & V. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 66.
116 See Guillaume, Implications of the New Indicative Planning, in FRENCH INDUSTRIAL POLICY,
supra note 72, at 119, 121-122. In a monumental study of French industrial policy, RESTRUCTUR-
ING THE FRENCH ECONOMY: BUSINESS, GOvERNMENT, AND COMPETITION SINCE WORLD WAR
II (forthcoming 1988), William James Adams finds that France's post-World War II gains in pro-




The Italian industrial experience is significant in at least two impor-
tant respects. First, Italian industry exhibits a "dual" structure. On the
one hand, it comprises a handful of gigantic conglomerates promoted by
the state. On the other, it is made up of an extensive and rapidly growing
private sector of innovative small firms. Second, and especially striking,
the economic performance of these two groups has differed dramatically:
the giants have performed woefully, while the small firm sector has
sparked the country's competitiveness, both at home and in international
markets.
A. The Large Firm Sector
The most conspicuous firm on the Italian industrial landscape, and
by far the biggest, is the Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale
("IRI"). This state-owned enterprise was created by Mussolini in 1933
to absorb the assets of failing firms and banks during the Great Depres-
sion, as well as to act as a driving force for Italian industrialization.
17
Through five decades of acquisitions and absorptions, IRI has grown to
mammoth proportions. IRI encompasses over 1,000 individual firms,
471,000 workers, and accounts for 5% of total national investment, 11%
of national R&D (research and development) expenditures, and 3.3% of
the total national workforce (including 6% of all manufacturing employ-
ment).I 8 IRI's operations, reaching from cast iron to ice cream, include:
Finsider (the second largest steel producer in Europe, and the fourth
largest in the world, controlling nearly 60% of the Italian steel industry
through more than forty major iron and steel companies); Alfa Romeo;
Alitalia; Stet (telecommunications and electronics); Finmare (producing
90% of Italian shipbuilding); and SME (food processing). In addition,
IRI controls over sixty banking organizations, representing 17% of na-
tional banking.1 19 Overall, IRI ranks as the third largest industrial cor-
poration outside the United States. 12 Other Italian giants include
Montedison (created in 1966 by the merger of Italy's two largest chemi-
mon Market competition rather than to the government's policy of fostering industry concentration
and promoting "national champions."
117 V. PRICE, supra note 80, at 65.
118 P. Bianchi, IRI: STRATEGIC ROLE AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON ITALIAN PUBLIC
SHARE-HOLDINGS, 3-4 (Univ. of Bologna, Dept. of Econ.)(Sept. 1986); The International 500, FOR-
TUNE, Aug. 3, 1987, at 215.
119 P. Bianchi, supra note 118, at 21-23; THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1985, at 59.
120 The International 500, supra note 118.
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cal concerns),121 and ENI (a petroleum combine which absorbed inter
alia two large Italian textile firms in the 1960s).12 z
But mergers, acquisitions, consolidations and corporate bigness have
scarcely been conducive to world-class economic performance in Italian
industry. On a consolidated basis, IRI posted losses in every year from
1973 to 1985. Its accumulated debts reached $21 billion by the end of
1978, and by 1980, its losses amounted to $5 million per day.123 Com-
menting on the firm's performance, The Economist has pointed out: "It
is no good saying that [IRI's losses] look so bad because it is lumbered
with all the heavy, basic industries that are in trouble throughout the
industrialised world: it was supposed to be an efficient mechanism for
adjusting such sectors to adverse structural changes."124 The Italian
government conceded as much in a 1981 document prepared by the Min-
istry of State Share-Holdings:
The crisis of the largest Italian firm shows its deepest intensity in the pub-
lic-owned firms: in the last five years they lost more than 9,500 billion lira
with an alarming progression that does not give any signal of decreas-
ing.... The system of public Share-holdings... has become terribly costly
in terms of collective resources absorbed, while the results are worsening
every day. 125
Across the board, the performance of these giant firms has been unim-
pressive. Finsider, the IRI-owned steel giant, recorded positive profits in
only two years between 1970 and 1981.126 IRI's delays, errors and ineffi-
ciencies seem to have had a negative impact on Italy's electronics indus-
tries,127 while consolidation in textiles has created "an uncompetitive
segment that is a burden on the public purse." 121
Similarly, six years following its formation, Montedison-producing
chemicals, textiles, and virtually everything from pickled pig's feet to
womens underwear-was in serious financial straits. It was "a sprawling
network of antiquated facilities spread around Italy." 129 It suffered accu-
mulated losses of more than $600 million. It was "a merger that mani-
121 Merger ofltaly's Two Largest Chemcial Firms Is Effected, Wall St. J., July 8, 1966, at 14, col.
3.
122 P. Bianchi, supra note 118, at 15.
123 IRI Swings to Profit for First Time Since 1973, Wall St. J., May 29, 1987, at 22, col. 3 [herein-
after IRI Profit]; V. PRICE, supra note 80, at 66; THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1981, at 28.
124 THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1981, at 28, 33.
125 P. Bianchi, supra note 118, at 17.
126 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS INTERNA-
TIONAL RIVALS 424 (1977); THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1981, at 33.
127 THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1981, at 33.
128 Shepherd, supra note 48, at 42.
129 Northrup, Italy's Huge, Troubled Montecatini Edison Expects Profits Again Within Three
Years, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1973, at 15, col. 1.
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festly didn't work" 3°--a characterization confirmed by the firm's
subsequent losses and continual need for government financial aid.13'
B. The Small Firm Sector
This sector of Italian industry comprises tens of thousands of small
firms, sprawling across the villages and small cities of central and north-
ern Italy. These firms seldom employ more than 50 to 100 workers.
They specialize in the production of a wide array of sophisticated goods,
including motorcycles, agricultural equipment, automotive parts, and
machine tools, as well as shoes and textiles. They are radically decentral-
ized and non-integrated; they have organized cooperatives for providing
accounting, tax, and marketing and purchasing services.132
The emergence of this sector occurred virtually by accident, and was
quite unplanned by the state. Seeking to evade what they perceived as
restrictive work rules and onerous head taxes, large Italian firms in the
1960s began subcontracting work to small firms. These small companies,
in turn, gradually sought to break away from dependence upon their
large patron-producers, and began to develop and market products of
their own, both at home and abroad.' 33 By 1980, 110,000 firms em-
ployed between twenty and 500 workers, a 35% increase over the decade
of the 1970s.1
34
In sharp contrast to the failures and inefficiencies of giant firms like
IRI, these small firms have attained remarkable success and have almost
single-handedly contributed to a renaissance of the Italian economy in
recent years. They are highly efficient and innovative-not despite their
small size, but because of it. By farming out production to suppliers and
service companies, Business Week reports, the smaller Italian firm
holds down capital requirements and overhead and helps to stabilize pro-
duction costs because the suppliers work to fixed-price contracts. In addi-
130 Id.
131 See THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at 70-71; Spivak, Montedison, Big Italian ChemicalFirm
Struggles to Regain Its Financial Health, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1979, at 48, col.1; Italy Plans to Give
Chemical Industry S4.65 Billion of Aid, Wall. St. J., Feb. 20, 1981, at 32, col. 1.
132 See Brusco, The Emilian Model: Productive Decentralization and Social Integration, 7 CAM-
BRIDGE J. ECON. 167 (1982); Piore & Sabel, Italian Small Business Development: Lessons for U.S.
Industrial Policy, in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 392 (J. Zysman & L.
Tyson eds. 1983); Kindel and Brady, Creative Chaos, FORBES, Dec. 20, 1982, at 142; What Really
Keeps the Italian Economy Afloat, Bus. WK., Apr. 14, 1980, at 42.
133 Piore & Sabel, supra note 132, at 398, 404.
134 Bus. WK., Apr. 14, 1980, at 43. Particularly prominent in the small-firm sector are the
"Bresciani"-the approximately eighty small, independent steelmakers, the largest of which employs
no more than 500 workers. See, Italian Steel: The Bresciani, METAL BULL. MONTHLY, Sept. 1978,
9, 35 [hereinafter Italian Steel]; Spivak, Small Companies Fuel the Italian Economy, Thriving on
Flexibility, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1982, at 18, col. 2 [hereinafter Small Companies].
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tion, the small entrepreneurs are able to move faster than large companies
to exploit market opportunities, while the close personal contact between
owner-managers and employees enables them to escape much of the labor
strife that wracks major industries ... [T]hey are quick to spot market
openings and create products to fill them... [They] have carved out niches
in world markets by means of their flexibility in matching products-and
production runs-to the needs of special markets and individual
customers. 135
The small entrepreneurs adapt and utilize ultra-sophisticated equipment
and manufacturing techniques. 136  Their wage scale averages 10% to
15% above wages paid by large manufacturers for comparable jobs.
13 7
Moreover, the regions where these small producers are located have en-
joyed greater job and income growth relative to the rest of the nation. 38
Overhead costs are estimated to be one-third to one-fourth those in-
curred by large Italian producers. 139 The small entrepreneurs are also
highly competitive in international markets: "They export a large por-
tion of their output, in some industries, over three-quarters, without the
need for political intervention, protection, or compromise. Their exports
are growing rapidly, up thirty-five percent last year, and are now respon-
sible for some forty percent of total Italian exports."'" (By contrast,
"the large Italian firms-Montedison, Alfa Romeo, Pirelli, Fiat Automo-
tives, Italsider-are operating in the red, despite indirect subsidies. Their
investment rates are low and heading lower, while export growth is slug-
gish at best."' 141)
The advantages of smaller corporate size are equally evident in the
Italian steel industry. The giant Italian steel producers "are enormous
lossmakers for IRI and stand in sharp, and embarrassing, contrast to the
efficiency and profitability of the small independent steel producers in the
north."' 4 Repudiating the conventional wisdom concerning size and
economies of scale in steelmaking, 143 the so-called Bresciani operate
super-sophisticated, non-integrated "minimill" plants. Specialization in
one or a few products enables them to keep plant sizes small, to keep
135 Bus. WK., Apr. 14, 1980, at 43.
136 Piore & Sabel, supra note 132, at 393.
137 Bus. WK., Apr. 14, 1980, at 47.
138 PIORE & SABEL, supra note 132 at 405.
139 Small Companies, supra note 134.
140 S. COHEN & P. GOUREVITCH, supra note 81, at 27.
141 Id. at 28.
142 V. PRICE, supra note 80, at 96-97.
143 Of efforts to prove the Bresciani could not, in fact, be economically viable, one observer has
said: "the Bresciani have not read Mr. Galbraith and, an even greater fault, have not read Professor
Frumento-so they are not aware that they are in their death throes. These steelmakers, unaware of
economic theory, have kept on producing and have been able to survive and even to drive bigger
producers out of the market for some particular products." Italian Steel, supra note 134, at 27.
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capital costs and overhead low, and to maintain high productivity. Small
size fosters a high degree of operational flexibility in delivering "in an
extremely short time the quantity, quality and sizes required" by buy-
ers. 14 By avoiding high depreciation expenses and financial burdens,
they have achieved "a remarkable cash-flow which eventually enabled
them . . to renew their installations using up-to-date and sometimes
revolutionary concepts." '145 In fact, the Bresciani, not the giant steel
firms, were the first to install highly-efficient continuous casting facilities.
By 1978, nearly all Bresciani steel was continuously cast. 146 Today, they
are able to produce a ton of steel in about half the time required by the
average European producer.147
Initially derided by European Big Steel, the Bresciani have proven
to be a potent competitive force. They have captured market share from
large Italian firms in the markets where they compete. Furthermore,
they have boosted their exports from 10% of production in 1967 to 30%
to 40% of production by the mid-1970s. The Bresciani also have weath-
ered (and even prospered during) recurrent steel "crises". Indeed, their
efficiency and low prices have been the persistent bane of the European
steel cartel and cartel efforts to fix prices high enough to allow Big Steel
to survive.
148
In Italy, then, smaller corporate size (Forbes suggests) seems to be
the wave of the future. 49 "During the last two years," the deputy presi-
dent of Italy's national business organization recently observed, "the
strength of small business has been the most important support of the
Italian economy. '  Now, even the biggest Italian firm is implementing
this new "new learning." Romano Prodi, IRI's current president and
one of Italy's leading economists, is returning the giant firm to profitabil-
ity-in important part by reducing IRI's size, and by divesting a number
of operating divisions (including Alfa Romeo).151 Prodi's credo is "tag-
hare, tagliare, e ancora tagliare" (cut, cut, and cut again).
152
144 Id. at 33.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 15.
147 Small Companies, supra note 134.
148 See Italian Steel, supra note 134, at 15; V. PRICE, supra note 80, at 89.
149 The Wave of the Future?, FORBES, Dec. 20, 1982, at 142.
150 Small Companies, supra note 134, at 1, col. 1
151 Symonds, The Turnaround Sparking A New Italian Renaissance, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1987, at
60; IRI Profit, supra note 123.
152 LA REPUBLICA, Sept. 7, 1983, in Y. MENY & V. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 17. Prodi an-
nounced this policy after Finsider's 1982 losses had reached 1,436 billion lire or 20 billion lire per
worker. In 1983, when Finsider's production fell by 27% compared to the previous year, the polit-
ical leaders in Rome agreed that "il momento della veriti" had finally arrived. Id.
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V. WEST GERMANY
Viewed in terms of structure and policy, the salient features of West
German industry can be divided into three eras. First, following the end
of World War II in 1945, the Allied authorities instituted a program of
deconcentration of West German industry. Although not as far-reaching
as that implemented in post-war Japan, the deconcentration program
was nevertheless not insubstantial. The giant chemical combine, IG
Farben, was broken into three separate producers-BASF, Bayer, and
Hoechst. Twelve large coal and steel firms, accounting for over 90% of
the country's steel production and more than half of its coal output, were
dissolved into twenty-eight independent firms. Substantial deconcentra-
tion of commercial banking was also undertaken.153 Significantly, an im-
portant consequence of these structural reorganizations was to bolster
economic performance. Some allies "thought they were limiting German
industrial power for the future," The Economist stated, "but were instead
increasing it, when they broke up I.G. Farben into three smaller and
therefore more efficient firms."'
154
Second, like other European nations, the West German government
during the 1960s flirted with the bigness mystique. In 1967, for example,
the government announced: "Larger markets demand in many ways
larger and more efficient company units.... The Federal government is
concerned to remove obstacles which stand in the way of concentration
of enterprises... so that the development of firms of optimum size will
not be hindered."' 55 As a result, the merger rate quickened. In the two-
year period from 1969 to 1970, the number of mergers exceeded the
number consummated during the entire preceding decade.' 56 Big-firm
mergers, involving companies with sales of billions of deutschmarks, es-
calated sharply and included horizontal mergers between firms in the
same industry, as well as large conglomerate acquisitions.
Third, but in sharp contrast with events in France and the United
Kingdom, West German infatuation with mergers and corporate bigness
was attenuated in the early-1970s. Worried that industrial "concentra-
tion can also lead to a decline in workable competition," the Government
concluded that the "number one problem of economic policy [was] the
concentration of enterprises.""' 7 German cartel legislation was subse-
quently expanded to reach anticompetitive mergers and concentration,
153 See 0. Smith, The West German Economy 16 (1983).
154 Big Won't Work, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 25, 1976, at 60, 61.
155 Kuster, Germany, in BIG BUSINESS, supra note 71, at 64, 79.
156 Id. at 79-80.
157 Id. at 81-82.
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and has since sought "to encourage competition to a degree that is
unique in Western Europe." '15 8 Indeed, the Wall Street Journal reported
in 1986 that at the very time when antitrust support was wavering in the
United States, the West German antitrust agency (Bundeskartellamt)
was tightening up and redoubling its enforcement efforts. 5 9
This evolution in German thinking may have been influenced by
newly available empirical evidence. One exhaustive analysis, for exam-
ple, reported that mergers and acquisitions did not result in significant
gains in economic performance in West Germany, and that they were not
conducive either to scale economies or to improved risk-bearing capacity.
Where positive results were achieved, they were due less to "exploited
efficiency improvements and output gains and more indicative of in-
creased market power."'160
Experience with some notable instances of government-sanctioned
consolidation may also have had an effect. Amalgamating twenty-six
hard-coal mining concerns to form Ruhrkohle A.G. has necessitated
continual import protection of the coal industry, at a sizable cost to Ger-
man steel producers.16 ' AEG Telefunken embarked on a large-scale pro-
gram of acquisitions, became "a loss-making albatross with holdings all
over the world," and by 1982 required massive government support to
remain solvent. 162 Government-sanctioned consolidations in steel during
the 1970s-including the merging of three major producers in 1974 to
create the second largest steel producing concern in Europe-have not
ameliorated the industry's serious performance problems. Instead, they
have led to successive crises and big-firm bankruptcies. 63 Volkswagen's
acquisition of Triumph-Adler Werke (an office equipment manufacturer)
soured, 16 while Daimler-Benz's conglomerate acquisition spree has ex-
acerbated the firm's economic problems. 65 Efforts to create "national
158 V. PRICE, supra note 80, at 52, 55.
159 Gumbel, West Germany's Cartel Office Tightens Its Grip, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1986, at 31, col.
1. Although the number of West German consolidations continued to rise following the enactment
of tighter merger controls in the early-1970s, this appears to be due to an increase in mergers involv-
ing smaller firms whose size fell below the threshold contained in German merger law. See Cable,
Palfry, & Runge, Federal Republic of Germany, 1964-1974 in THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS
OF MERGERS, supra note 70, at 99, 101-04 [hereinafter Cable].
160 Cable, supra note 159, at 130.
161 Kuster, supra note 155, at 75-76; FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 126, at 337.
162 O. SMITH, supra note 153, at 281; Banks and Bonn Set Credit Terms to SaveAEG-Telefunken
AG, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 25, col. 5.
163 West Germany Grants Approval to Merger of 3 Steel Concerns, Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1974, at 7,
col. 2; Hart, supra note 23, at 169-73.
164 Lenel, A Review of the Third Report of the Monopolies Commission of West Germany, 28
ANTrrRuST BuLL. 757, 775 (1983).
165 O'Boyle, Daimler-Benz Negotiates Bumpy Course, Wall St. 3., Jan. 8, 1988, at 16, col. 1.
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champions" in computers have also languished. 66
Conversely, maintenance of competitive market structures has en-
hanced German economic performance in such fields as textiles and
machine tools.'6 7 On the innovation front, the IFO economics institute in
Munich has found that small German companies are more likely to ex-
ploit new inventions than large firms: "Seventy percent of new ideas were
incorporated into the products of small companies-with sales of up to
DM15million-within two years; within large companies only about one-
third of the new ideas was used."' 68 In sum, in Germany, as in Great
Britain and France, the efficiencies and innovative vigor of smaller, en-
trepreneurial businesses are now being increasingly recognized, and at




The Japanese experience is a particularly relevant case study. In
spite of much that has been written about "Japan Inc.," there is little
empirical support for the proposition that Japan's economic "miracle" in
the post-war era is attributable to merger-induced bigness and high in-
dustry concentration. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to the
contrary.
A. Dissolution and Deconcentration Under Post-War
Allied Occupation
Typically overlooked is the fact that, under the post-war occupation,
the Japanese economy was subjected to a thoroughgoing structural
deconcentration and trust-busting program. The targets were the colos-
sal industrial, commercial and financial conglomerate combines-zaibat-
sus-which dominated the economy in the decades leading up to World
War II.1'°
166 English, The European Information Technology Industry, in EUROPEAN INDUSTRY: PUBLIC
POLICY AND CORPORATE STRATEGY, supra note 18, at 227, 231.
167 See Shepherd, supra note 48, at 47-48; Harrop, supra note 56, at 69; Sabel & Herrigel, Losing
A Market to A High-Wage Nation, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1987, § 3, at 2, col. 2.
168 West Germany, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 1986, at 19.
169 See Thurow, New Vigor is Infusing Small-Business Sector of German Economy, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 28, 1984, at 1, col. 1. For an overview of German antitrust policy, see I. SCHMIDT,
WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK UND KARTELLRECHT 150-69 (1987). For proposals to close the merger
"loophole" in the German antitrust law and to authorize divestitures, see Monopolkommission, Fu-
sionskontrolle Bleibt Vorrangig (Hauptgutachten 1978-79) 178-207 (1980).
170 At the close of the war, the 10 largest zaibatsus were estimated to collectively control, directly
and indirectly, fully one-third of all business enterprise in Japan. They controlled large shares of the
financial sector, heavy industry and light industry, as well as other fields. See E. HADLEY, ANTI-
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In a presidential directive of September 6, 1945, General MacAr-
thur was ordered to devise "a program for the dissolution of the large
industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a
great part of Japan's trade and industry." '171 Specifically, the object of
the U.S. government was to establish an agency to plan for "dissolving
large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other large concentra-
tions of private control," to "dissolve the control associations," to abro-
gate "all legislative or administrative measures which limit free entry of
firms into industries," and to "terminate and prohibit all Japanese partic-
ipation in private international cartels or other restrictive private interna-
tional contracts or arrangements." 172 The aim
was to give all Japanese businessmen the opportunity to engage in the mod-
em sector of the economy, that is, to remove those conditions which pre-
served this sector for the chosen few, those conditions which in fact made it
a private collectivism. The aim was to broaden the basis of ownership in
the modem sector from a handful of business families of giant fortunes to
ownership by the many.
173
True to announced intent, a massive deconcentration program was im-
plemented: sixteen of the largest holding companies were dissolved out-
right; twenty-six were dissolved and reorganized; eleven were
reorganized without dissolution; and nineteen companies with "excessive
concentration" were reorganized and split up.174 The last category in-
cluded the following structural deconcentrations:
1) Japan Iron and Steel (company dissolved, four new firms
created);
2) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (company dissolved, three new
firms created);
3) Mitsui Mining (company continued, but coal and metal opera-
tions divested);
4) Sumitomo Mining (company continued, three new firms
created);
5) Oji Paper (old company dissolved, three new firms created);
6) Teikoku Fiber (company dissolved into three parts);
7) Daiken Industries (company dissolved, four new firms created);
8) Toyo Can (company continued, one new firm created);
9) Dainippon Beer (company dissolved, two new firms created);
10) Hokkaido Dairy Co. (company dissolved, two new firms
created);
TRUST IN JAPAN 45, 48-49 (1970). In addition, cartels were rampant, with more than 8,000 control
agreements uncovered at the national and local level during the Allied occupation. Id. at 368.
171 Id. at 6.
172 Id. at 8.
173 Id. at 19.
174 Id. at 443.
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11) Hitachi Manufacturing (disposal of nineteen plants);
12) Toshiba (disposal of twenty-seven plants and one research
laboratory);
13) Teikoku Petroleum (divestiture of securities and petroleum ex-
ploration rights);
14) Japan Explosives (divestiture of securities);
15) Schokiku Motion Pictures (divestiture of securities); and
16) Toho Motion Pictures (divestiture of securities).
175
In addition, eighty-three holding companies were designated for dissolu-
tion. 176 The two largest of these, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, were divided
into some 200 successor firms. 17 7 Furthermore, an accompanying pro-
gram of forced securities disposal involved the sale of possibly as much as
one-half of the 1945 paid-in value of all corporate securities in Japan, and
affected a total of roughly 4,000 companies.
171
The structurally more competitive milieu which emerged in the
wake of these programs has been an important-and frequently underes-
timated-factor in the subsequent Japanese "miracle." As Eleanor Had-
ley points out:
With much of the world marveling at the Japanese economy's extraordi-
nary post-1954 performance, it is impossible to conclude that [the decon-
centration reforms] injured the economy. In fact, it may well be argued
that they have been an integral part of the exceptional pace of recent
growth. The unrestrained rivalry for market position appears to be an es-
sential part of the explanation of the extraordinary levels of investment; the
temporary breakup of the two giant trading companies has been an element
in the greater diffusion of foreign technology; and it would seem that part of
the vigor of these recent years comes from greater vitality in management,
from allowing corporations to act in their own best judgment rather than
confining decision-making to the councils of top holding companies.
179
B. Subsequent Concentration and Merger Trends
Through the 1960s, market concentration in Japan generally drifted
downward. Over the period 1949-1962, as well as over the shorter period
1955-1962, the three-firm concentration ratio fell in fourteen major Japa-
nese industries, rose in two, and remained unchanged in three industries.
Particularly pronounced trends toward less concentration and more
competitive market structures occurred in motor vehicles and steel. In
motor vehicles, the combined share of the three largest producers fell
from 98.9% in 1949, to 66.9% by 1962. For blast furnaces, three-firm
175 Id. at 178-79.
176 Id. at 70.
177 Id. at 148.
178 Id. at 182, 190.
179 Id. at 442.
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concentration fell from 89.9% to 65.7%, and for steel mills, from 58.3%
to 49.8% over the same period.18 0 More broadly, evidence suggests a
general deconcentration trend occurred in major Japanese industries in
the years 1960-1977.I8' A subsequent comparative study found markets
to be noticeably less concentrated in Japan than in the United States. 82
In fact, one expert argues that the emergence, growth, and success
of small business, and the concomitant deconcentration and decentraliza-
tion of manufacturing, are the foundation for what he calls Japan's "mis-
understood miracle." During Japan's high-growth postwar period,
David Friedman points out, "the structure of its manufacturing indus-
tries appears to have broadly diverged from that of the United States.
Japanese production increasingly took place in smaller firms, which em-
ployed the vast majority of the country's manufacturing work force and
accounted for close to 60 percent of the national value added. In the
United States, by contrast, the number of small firms stabilized as the
largest producers employed most of the work force and accounted for
close to 65 percent of manufacturing value added." '183 Indeed, the gene-
sis of Japan's thriving small-firm sector is similar to that in Italy: initially
sprouting up to serve the subcontracting needs of large firms, small Japa-
nese manufacturers subsequently developed their own sophisticated
products and evolved away from dependence on large patron-producers.
In the Sakaki region of Japan, for example, small-firm manufacturing
initially was ignited by automotive subcontracting. But these small firms
pioneered their own products and product niches, with many coming to
dominate world markets: "By the early 1980s one local firm, Nissei, held
65 percent of the global market for blood pressure testers; another,
Nakajima All Precision, captured 20 percent of the world market for
manual typewriter keyboards and 35 percent of the U.S. market for elec-
180 Economic Concentration Hearings, supra note 16, at 3543-44. According to one first hand
investigator, an important factor behind declining industrial concentration was post-war antimono-
poly policy: "The largest firms were broken up under the Act on the Exclusion of Excessive Monop-
oly Power and for a time were restrained from making mergers afterward. This, plus the elimination
of controls over production, facilitated the entry of new firms, which have prospered in Japan's rapid
economic growth since 1955." Id. at 3544. See also Hosomi & Okumura, Japanese Industrial Policy,
in NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 123, 149 (3. Pinder ed. 1982).
(table 5.9).
181 Id.
182 R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 19 (1976). More generally,
aggregate concentration in the Japanese economy (measured by the share of all manufacturing col-
Iectively accounted for by the 100 largest producers) dramaticallyfell over the post-World War II
era; by the early-1970s, aggregate concentration in Japanese manufacturing was substantially below
that in the United States. See Iguchi, Aggregate Concentration, Turnover, and Mobility Among the
Largest Manufacturing Firms in Japan, 32 ANTrrRUST BULL. 939, 944-49 (1987).
183 D. FRIEDMAN, THE MISUNDERSTOOD MIRACLE 9-10 (1988).
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tric models; Takeuchi led the world in the production of mini-backhoe
construction equipment; and Soar, a maker of portable, sophisticated
electrical testers, in ten years grew from a family operation to an enter-
prise operating throughout the world."' 84 Nor are these isolated devel-
opments. Throughout Japan, Friedman concludes,
the dramatic trends toward independence, increased technical skill, and
specialized small and medium-sized enterprise support indicate the same
kind of industrial outcome in even the largest metropolitan areas. Collec-
tively, urban and rural industrial hamlets have changed the shape of Japa-
nese manufacturing, leading toward a decentralized economy of great
flexibility. 1'
8 5
Japan has not been immune from mergers and acquisition, either
during the 1960s or, more recently, in the 1980s. Nonetheless, the merg-
ers that do occur primarily involve small firms. Between 1960 and 1970,
for example, more than 9,000 mergers were recorded. Of these, however,
only fifty-seven were capitalized at a value exceeding $3 million, and the
bulk of them were in the distribution sector. 186 Likewise, approximately
2,000 Japanese mergers and acquisitions in 1986 were valued at $3 bil-
lion. In the same year, by contrast, the roughly 3,000 mergers and acqui-
sitions in the United States were valued at $180 billion-or, sixty times
the Japanese total. 1
87
Moreover, the mergers and acquisitions that do occur in Japan ap-
pear to be no more successful than elsewhere. For example, one recent
study finds "little evidence to suggest that increased concentration
among the largest few firms has significant favorable effects on market
performance, and much evidence of unfavorable effects."' 88 Other stud-
ies report either no discernible effect of mergers, or degradations in some
measures of performance following merger.
189
C. Industry Resistance to Government Consolidation Efforts
Given the allegations of government-industry collaboration in "Ja-
pan Inc.," it is noteworthy that a number of Japanese industries have
184 Id. at 182.
185 Id. at 200.
186 Trezise & Suzuki, Politics, Government, and Economic Growth in Japan, in ASIA'S NEw GI-
ANT 804 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976).
187 THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 1987, at 94. Although the largest pre-war zaibatsus took some
steps to partially reconstitute themselves later, informed opinion concludes that they have not signifi-
cantly diminished competitiveness in the Japanese economy. E. HADLEY, supra note 170, at 253-56;
R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, supra note 182, at 63-67.
188 R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, supra note 182, at 158.
189 See Hoshino, General Comparison of Financial Characteristics Between Merging and




resisted government efforts to create "national champions" via consolida-
tion. Prominent among these are automobiles, steel, computer/electron-
ics, and machine tools-in other words, some of the most successful
Japanese competitors in global markets.
In motor vehicles, for example, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry ("MITI") sought as early as 1953 to concentrate produc-
tion of automobiles in one or at most two established firms (Nissan,
Toyota), and to preclude new entry. When three new firms (Mitsubishi,
Fuji, Mazda) commenced automobile production, cutting the combined
Toyota-Nissan market share from three-quarters to less than one-half,
MITI was alarmed. Government authorities worried "that a large
number of competing auto firms could only result in disaster. The Minis-
try also reasoned that excessive competition among the manufacturers
would be detrimental to bringing the Japanese auto industry into a com-
petitive position with the American 'Big Three'." 90 Prime Minister
Ikeda voiced his concern that "the Japanese automobile manufacturers
will not become competitive with General Motors and Ford under the
current [competitive, unregulated entry] situation." 191 Yet another gov-
ernment official warned that "in the light of the general trends in the
world among industries, and in the light of the present situation in our
country too, six [automobile] companies are too many... [and] five or
six companies will not be possible."
192
In 1961 MITI announced plans to consolidate Japanese automakers
into just three large concerns, to limit each of these firms to a single
segment of the market, and to bar newcomers (including Honda) from
the field.193 But in the face of intense industry opposition, MITI aban-
doned its consolidation plan. By 1965, Japan had eight highly competi-
tive car companies, and by 1984, the number had grown to nine.
Japanese automakers had prevailed against the world-and against their
own government's faith in bigness-by-consolidation.
As with the automobile industry, MITI attempted to consolidate
steel production in the hands of a few giant firms. Nevertheless, it was
again thwarted by the industry. In 1949, Kawasaki constructed Japan's
first modem post-war integrated steel plant against the wishes of MITI
and the Bank of Japan. Similarly, in 1965, Sumitomo continued to ex-
pand its capacity despite opposition and even sanctions by MITI.9 4 The
190 SAKIYA, HONDA MOTOR: THE MEN, THE MANAGEMENT, THE MACHINES 136-37 (1982).
191 E. KAPLAN, JAPAN: THE GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 123 (1972).
192 W. DUNCAN, U.S.-JAPAN AUTOMOBILE DIPLOMACY 90-91 (1973).
193 Magaziner, Japanese Industrial Policy, in THE JAPANESE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: MODEL
AND CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE? 82 (R. Cole ed. 1981).
194 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 126, at 327; Ohmae, Japan vs. Japan: Only the Strong
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industry also rejected a committee report issued in 1966 by MITI's In-
dustrial Structure Council, which proposed concentrating the industry
into three or four giant groups. 95 A 1965 MITI report calling for con-
solidation of the specialty steel sector also went unheeded.196 Finally,
although the two largest steel firms were permitted to merge in 1969 to
create Nippon Steel, the result was not exceptionally constructive, and
produced few ascertainable economies of scale. 197
The computer and electronics industries have also persistently
shunned government consolidation efforts. Although observers report
that MITI has long been interested in consolidating computers, the tradi-
tional independence, competitiveness, and pride of computer manufac-
turers seem to have rendered corporate amalgamation infeasible.198 Over
the years 1957-1961, seven firms undertook computer production in Ja-
pan. By the early 1970s, the country had six computer manufacturers (in
contrast with one "national champion" in the United Kingdom, and one
in France). 199
In machine tools, too, the Japanese government tried-and failed-
to promote mergers and concentrated corporate giantism:
from the 1930s onward the bureaucracy attempted to implement policies
that would have reversed almost all of the activities associated with the
rapid growth of the machine tool industry. In the prewar period the
Machine Tool Industry Law and the toseikai scheme attempted to limit the
number of firms that could build machinery, generating economies of scale.
These policies were failures. After the war MITI tried to promote consoli-
dation, cartels, scale economies, and stable markets with various Special
Measure laws. Its efforts did not transform the industry, Nor was private
coordination successful; gyokai production restraint programs failed to re-
duce firm entry or limit product development .... Instead, Japanese ma-
chinery makers fragmented the market: new entrants flooded high-tech
equipment sectors, existing firms flatly refused to coordinate or consolidate
production.
200
As the president of one machine tool manufacturer put it, MITI "told us
to form into larger companies. We told them 'the hell with that' and
Survive, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 20, col. 3. Japan Steel, created when the Japanese government
merged together the nation's seven largest steel producers in 1934, had been dissolved by the Allies
during the post-war occupation.
195 E. KAPLAN, supra note 191, at 177.
196 Id. at 155-56.
197 Id. at 151.
198 Id. at 98-99; Kikkawa, Shipbuilding, Motor Cars and Semiconductors: The Diminishing Role
of Industrial Policy in Japan, in EUROPE'S INDUSTRIES, supra note 48, 236, 260.
199 E. KAPLAN, supra note 191, at 82; Jequier, Computers, in BIG BUSINESS, supra note 71, at
195, 214-16.
200 D. FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 33, 202.
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refused."2 "1 As a result, the number of competitors in the field escalated
over the postwar years, and concentration in the industry declined.2 "2
Thus, the Japanese experience suggests that the country's remarka-
ble post-war performance may be attributed more to competitive domes-
tic market structures-put into place by the Allies, and largely
maintained despite government efforts to erode them-than to any al-
leged government-industry collaborationism, the country's unique cul-
tural ethic and social homogeneity, or a manipulation of the yen. To
"understand why Japanese companies do so well on world markets,"
Ken Ohrnae points out, "it's important to recognize that they have built
up their competitive strengths in perhaps the world's most competitive
domestic industry.
'20 3
VII. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Community-wide analyses and statistical investigations of mergers,
corporate bigness and industrial concentration corroborate the foregoing
findings. A 1973 study of corporate size and economic performance in
Great Britain and the European Community, for example, found that,
"for the largest European firms, the net effect indicates that size must
mainly increase average costs, because of control loss or some other form
of 'X-inefficiency'," and that "the actual increase in economic concentra-
tion does not bring superior results in terms of profit or growth rates
along with it.
' 2 0
A 1977 survey of empirical evidence reported that "as far as the
effects of large firm size in Europe is concerned, no evidence of increasing
profit, faster growth or more intensive research activities can be found to
support the 'size mystique' that has prevailed in Europe." The survey
concluded that "the benefits of regrouping and mergers are exaggerated
and... performance does not improve with size."
'205
In 1980, a comparative statistical analysis of mergers in seven coun-
tries found: "No consistent pattern of either improved or deteriorated
profitability can therefore be claimed across the seven countries. Merg-
ers would appear to result in a slight improvement here, a slight worsen-
ing of performance there .... Any economic efficiency gains from the
201 Id at 100.
202 Id. at 108-13.
203 Ohmae, supra note 194.
204 Jacquemin & de Lichtbuer, Size, Structure, Stability and Performance of the Largest British
and EEC Firms, 4 EUR. ECON. REv. 393, 405, 407 (1973).
205 A. JACQUEMIN & H. DE JONG, EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 156, 252 (1977).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:1(1988)
mergers would appear to be small. ."206
In 1984, another cross-country comparative study summarized the
evidence in the following terms:
Numerous econometric studies put into question the view that higher prof-
itability, faster growth, and more intensive research activity could be ex-
pected from larger European firms. Most authors find no (or a negative)
relationship between firm size and profitability. Very similar results have
been obtained by looking at the consequence of mergers, which usually ap-
pear to result in lower profits and sometimes even in lower growth for the
acquiring firm. Since these effects have been observed for as long as seven
years after a merger, it is hard to argue that they reflect transitional costs.
Certainly more direct studies of the productivity effects of mergers confirm
that the efficiency claims in favor of most mergers are either imaginary or
else vastly inflated. Direct estimation and measurement of single and multi-
product scale economies similarly confirms that few of the larger plants of
more heavily concentrated industries can be justified by scale economies.
The growth rate of sales seems to be more or less independent of firm size,
which suggests that no comparative dynamic efficiencies exist.
20 7
Economic performance, de Jong found, would not be improved by en-
couraging corporate bigness. To the contrary, he argued that "concen-
tration and stagnation mutually reinforce each other, not only because
fewer decision centres come forward with fewer initiatives, but also be-
cause these centres have an interest in preserving the status quo."2 °8
With respect to antitrust policies, Geroski and Jacquemin found that "a
relaxation of the European competition policy would not strengthen the
Community's industrial policy. . . Any change aimed at organizing
more cartels or favouring more mergers will not help provide domestic
restructuring, nor will it improve European competitiveness in exports or
imports.
20 9
These results have not gone unnoticed by the European business
press, or by progressive European business leaders. For example, in a
recent special insert entitled "The New Entrepreneurs," the conservative
Economist pointed out that "conglomerate companies, built by people
who believed that being big and diversified was safe, found instead that
large, lumbering organizations were often the last to hear about innova-
tions."2 0 After reviewing the evidence, the magazine editorialized that
mergers are "as likely to strangle their perpetrators as their competi-
206 Mueller, A Cross-National Comparison of the Results, in THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS
OF MERGERS, supra note 70, at 299, 306.
207 Geroski & Jacquemin, supra note 18, at 347 (citations omitted).
208 de Jong, Sectoral Development and Sectoral Policies in the EC, in EUROPEAN INDUSTRY:
PUBLIC POLICY AND CORPORATE STRATEGY, supra note 18, at 147, 167.
209 Geroski & Jacquemin, supra note 18, at 357.
210 THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1983, at 61.
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tors."21 1 With respect to the European automobile industry, in particu-
lar, it said: "The worst mistakes were made by believers in industrial
strategies who thought that bigger meant better: 'economies of scale' are
often better translated as 'if you will join with me, we may both be able to
stay inefficient longer.' "212
Among some pragmatic businesspeople, too, the love affair with big-
ness appears to be coming to an end. "Giant conglomerates in European
industry are scaling down into leaner and more specialized compa-
nies," 213 the Wall Street Journal reported recently. Divesting, streamlin-
ing, and specializing are now beginning to be viewed as the best means
for European industry to meet the competitive challenge of the global
marketplace.214 Worried about falling further behind in the technology
race, European behemoths are increasingly turning to small, en-
trepreneurial "start-up" companies for help.215
European governments, too, seem ready to reject the bigness myth.
In an apparent reorientation away from decades of conventional wisdom,
"nearly every country in Western Europe has implemented a program to
stimulate small business. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in England
and President Francois Mitterrand in France, in particular, have staked
great political capital on their small business initiatives. Indeed Euro-
pean leaders highlighted attention to small business by designating 1983
as the 'European Year of Small and Medium e nterprises.' "216
VIII. CONCLUSION
Two summary observations are in order. First, as we have seen,
there is a growing awareness on both sides of the Atlantic that merger-
induced corporate giantism is not the key to promoting operating effi-
ciency, technological innovation, and international competitiveness. In
the United States, both academic and business literature is replete with
empirical evidence on that score.217 In Europe, too, there is a growing
211 THE ECONOMIST, July 13, 1985, at 20.
212 THE EONOMIST, Aug. 30, 1986, at 9. "The group therapy that some claimed would come
from bundling together British Leyiand produced instead a demoralised, bureaucratised nightmare.
Fiat got nowhere with Citroen, and Renault went backwards with American Motors. Peugeot
nearly crippled itself by buying Chrysler's European interests, just as Chrysler did by buying them in
the first place." Id.
213 Nelson & Moore, Europe's Industries Take on Leaner Look, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 24,
col. 1.
214 Id.
215 Kirkland, Europe's New Entrepreneurs, FORTUNE, Apr. 27, 1987, at 260.
216 S. SOLOMON, SMALL BUSINESS USA 273 (1986).
217 The prominent business analyst, Tom Peters, puts it most emphatically: "What has been the
most venerated tradition in American economics, or, indeed, the American psyche-that big is good;
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recognition that small and medium-sized enterprise are prime engines of
economic growth and job creation.213
Second, in spite of the foregoing awareness, merger policy in both
the United States and the European Economic Community ("EEC") is
bedeviled by contradictions. In the United States, at least since 1950, the
government has been armed with strong legislative authority to combat
not only horizontal, but also vertical and conglomerate mergers.219 Yet,
bigger is better; biggest is best-isn't so. It wasn't so. And it surely won't be so in the future." T.
PETERS, THRIVING ON CHAOS 20 (1987). See also Structuring American Industry for Global Compe-
tition, 1986: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1986)(testimony of F.M. Scherer, Professor
of Economics, Swarthmore College); J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAV-
IOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 185-95 (1972); THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS, supra
note 70; M. FRANKENA & P. PAUTLER, ANTITRUST POLICY FOR DECLINING INDUSTRIES (Bureau
of Economics, Federal Trade Comm'n Oct. 1985); E. HERMAN & L. LOWENSTEIN, THE EFFI-
CIENCY EFFECTS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (Center for L. & Econ. Stud.,
Colum. Univ. Sch. of L. Working Paper No. 20, Jan. 1986); G. MEEKS, supra note 64; D. RAVEN-
SCRAFT & F. SCHERER, MERGERS AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE (Federal Trade Comm'n
Working Paper No. 137, Jan. 1986); D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER, THE PROFITABILITY OF
MERGERS (FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N WORKING PAPER No. 136, JAN. 1986); S. REID, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL ORDER 101-19 (1976); S. RHOADES, POWER, EMPIRE BUILDING, AND MERGERS 89-
118 (1983); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 459-
74 (1980); Laiken, Financial Performance of Merging Firms in a Virtually Unconstrained Legal Envi-
ronment, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 827 (1973); Langetieg, Haugen & Wichern, Merger and Stockholder
Risk, 15 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 689 (1980); Mason & Goudzwaard, Performance of
Conglomerate Firms A Portfolio Approach, 31 J. FIN. 39 (1976); Mueller, The Effects of Conglomer-
ate Mergers: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 315, 344 (1977); Mueller,
Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 259 (1985); Scherer, Takeovers: Pres-
ent and Future Dangers, BROOKINGS REV., Winter-Spring 1986, 15; Diversification Blues, MERGERS
& ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1987, 13-14.
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currently, there is no disposition in Washington to use that authority to
stem the spectacular mega-merger movement of the 1980s.220 Indeed,
the current Administration has advocated outright repeal of the anti-
merger law on the grounds that it is an obstacle to U.S. competitiveness
in world markets.221
In Europe, by contrast, whatever the disposition may be to control
mergers, the Treaty of Rome provides no explicit mechanism for doing
so. 222 For some thirty years now, like Pirandello's Play Six Characters in
Search of an Author, the EEC has unsuccessfully struggled for a way to
plug this loophole in the Treaty.
The situation is not without its irony. As James Rahl reminds us,
"America's perplexing problems of concentration and oligopoly exist
largely because of a lack of a strict anti-merger policy [before 1950]. "223
Europe later repeated the mistakes of this chapter in United States anti-
trust history-citing the brooding omnipresence of the United States cor-
porate giants as justification for its pro-merger, pro-concentration policy.
And today, U.S. policy makers seem intent on making the same mis-
220 See, Adams & Brock, The "New Learning" and the Euthanasia ofAntitrust, 74 CAL. L. REv.
1515, at 1540-46 (1986).
221 See Riggs & Dorminey, The Case For Revision of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 65 NEB. L.
REV. 808 (1986); Adams & Brock, The Proposed Emasculation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 65
NEB. L. REv. 813 (1986).
222 Article 85 prohibits "any agreement between undertakings... which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market." Treaty
Establishing the EEC, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958).
Article 86 provides "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States." Id. art. 86.
The Treaty contains no explicit provision barring anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions.
Recently, however, the Commission of the European Communities has circulated a proposed Com-
munity-wide statute specifically addressing anti-competitive mergers, acquisitions and takeovers.
Council of the European Communities, AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION (EEC) OF THE
COUNCIL ON THE CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS, Mar. 3, 1988. As
articulated in the proposed statute, "Mergers which give rise to or strengthen a dominant position in
the common market or in a substantial part of it are not compatible with the common market
(Article 2(2))." Id., "Explanatory Memorandum," at 2. The statute, as currently worded, specifies
that anticompetitiveness is to be "appraised by reference in particular to the possibilities of choice of
suppliers and consumers, to the market position and the economic and financial power of the under-
takings concerned, to their access to supplies or markets, to the structure of the markets affected, to
international competition, to legal and factual barriers to entry, and to supply and demand trends for
the relevant goods or services." Id., Art.2, par. 2.
For a penetrating comparative analysis, see Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United
States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 981 (1986)
223 Rahl, Competition and Antitrust in American Economic Policy: Are There Useful Lessons For
Europe?, 8 COMMON MKT L. REv. 284, at 291 (1971).
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take-calling for an abandonment of structural antitrust because of the
alleged domination of world markets by European and Japanese giants.
It would be sad indeed if, in the future, by a process of reciprocal
emulation, the major trading nations were to embrace industrial policies
animated by the allure of a sterile bigness mystique.
